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"What's the moral? . . . It could be just this: a civilized
divorce is a contradiction in terms. "2
I. INTRODUCTION
Divorce in modem day America is a product of legislative
creation,3 designed as an adversarial process focused on rights and
responsibilities. Authority to break marital bonds is vested in courts;
in the past forty years, however, reliance on judicial determination of
the rights and obligations that accrue upon divorce has diminished in
favor of private ordering,4 often achieved through alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) mechanisms.
Most experts agree that courts are ill-equipped to handle
interdisciplinary issues present in divorce cases. 5 Courts can address
legal issues that arise when a marriage is terminated, but are unable
2. THE WAR OF THE ROSES (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 1989).
3. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1888) (discussing the scope
of legislative power to regulate both marriage and divorce, which divests parties of
the ability to control marital status through contract).
4. Private ordering in the family law context allows individuals to define
their roles within the family unit, and designate rights and obligations attributable
to that status. Larry Peterman & Tiffany Jones, Defending Family Privacy, 5 J.L.
& FAM. STuD. 71, 76-77 (2003).
5. JANET JOHNSTON & VIVIENNE ROSEBY, IN THE NAME OF THE CHILD 223
(1998).
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to also ameliorate the psychological and emotional fallout. Litigant-
specific results that fit particular family situations are often
unavailable because statutory restrictions on judicial authority are
imposed.7  Judicial labor is reduced when orders fall within
parameters adopted by the legislature that make specific fact-finding
unnecessary.8 It is more expedient for judges to follow guidelines
that provide a one-size-fits-all solution rather than tailor orders to
meet individual family needs. Consequently, easing the trauma
suffered by a family falls outside judicial purview.
As a result of perceived inadequacies of the court system in
dealing with marital disputes, it is not surprising that practitioners
and litigants often turn to extra-judicial methods of resolving divorce
cases. Two forms of ADR that have been favored in dissolution of
marriage actions are mediation, first introduced as an ADR method
in the 1970s,9 and collaborative law, the veritable new kid on the
block, developed within the past twenty years.' 0 Today, proponents
of each ADR method vocally extol the perceived benefits."
Detractors are equally strident in highlighting shortcomings.12
6. See Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and
Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 750-52
(1988) (discussing the inability of the legal system to address the emotional
aspects of disputed custody).
7. Many courts are prohibited from ordering post-majority support for
children to meet college expenses; however, a parent can voluntarily agree to
assume such obligations in a divorce agreement. Linda D. Elrod, Summary of the
Year in Family Law, 27 FAM. L.Q. 485, 506 n.157 (1994) (citing Stokes v. Maris,
596 So.2d 879 (Miss. 1992)).
8. For example, many states require trial judges to include specific findings
of fact if deviations from statutory child support guidelines are ordered. E.g., FLA.
STAT. § 61.30 (2010) (requiring a written finding by the trier of fact explaining
why the guideline amount is unjust or inappropriate); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
19A, § 2007 (West Supp. 2009) (requiring the party requesting deviation to present
written, proposed findings based on sixteen criteria); MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN.
§ 552.605 (West 2005) (requiring a judge to set forth in writing or on the record
reasons the standard child support formula is unjust or inappropriate).
9. See Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Lawyers, Non-Lawyers and Mediation:
Rethinking the Professional Monopoly from a Problem-Solving Perspective, 7
HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 235, 242 (2002) (noting that mediation as a separate
profession emerged during the early 1970s).
10. See discussion infra Part 11I.B.
11. See discussion infra Parts III.A-B.
12. See discussion infra Parts III.A-B.
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Although the practice of each method has beneficial aspects
aimed at reducing the trauma associated with divorce litigation,
neither adequately fulfills the needs of litigants and lawyers
practicing in the area. Rather than eschewing one method in favor of
the other, there is a middle ground that combines favorable features
of each ADR paradigm to create a hybrid form of "cooperative
mediation." The cooperative mediation process proposed here
addresses many of the criticisms leveled against mediation and
collaborative law. It helps satisfy the parties' needs for procedural
and substantive justice, which litigants often feel is lacking in ADR
methods. It does not ignore the adversarial nature of divorce, but
still focuses on private ordering as the preferred method for resolving
divorce disputes in a cost-effective, extra-judicial manner.
Before examining the benefits and shortcomings of mediation
and collaborative law and detailing practice parameters for
cooperative mediation, Part II of this paper will discuss the
adversarial nature of divorce and its historical underpinnings
impacting the effectiveness of ADR methods.' Part III identifies,
critiques, and compares key process features of mediation and
collaborative law. Finally, Part IV will explain the proposed
paradigm for cooperative mediation and justification for inclusion of
certain process features.
II. DIVORCE IS AN ADVERSARIAL, RIGHTS-BASED PROCESS
The adversarial nature of divorce is implicit in the role that
marital fault has historically played in divorce actions. Because
changes in social and economic status often occur when property
rights are divided and obligations are imposed as a result of divorce,
the parties' interests generally conflict.14 When a finite amount of
resources are available to a family unit comprised of individual
13. This discussion is not intended to be a comprehensive analysis of the
global history of marriage and divorce.
14. See, e.g., Walden v. Hoke, 429 S.E.2d 504, 509-10 (W. Va. 1993)
(finding that a conflict of interest prevents an attorney from representing both
husband and wife in a divorce action because the parties' interests are adverse
even in uncontested divorce cases).
[Vol. 30:2248
WE CAN WORK IT OUT
interests that cannot be fully satisfied, competition for limited
resources causes the adversarial nature of divorce to continue.
The basic concept of assigning rights and obligations upon
divorce dates back to ancient times, during which entitlement was
predicated upon freedom from fault for the marital breakdown.1 5
During the late Eighteenth and early Nineteenth centuries, fairly
liberal laws permitting divorce in the United States generally focused
on whether the decree was to be judicially or legislatively granted.16
Little, if any, assessment was made of the divorcing parties' rights
and obligations vis-d-vis each other or their children, other than to
divide assets based on title and award alimony to a wife if she was
not responsible for the marital woes.' 7 In the mid-to-late nineteenth
century, in response to religious and moral outrage over the ease
with which marriages were dissolved, divorce laws became more
stringent re uiring a finding of marital fault before a divorce could
be granted.' The concept of marital fault, having its genesis in
ancient laws and being a by-product of religious beliefs that a
marriage should not be dissolved by man absent egregious fault by
one party, continued to result in a wife's entitlement to financial
15. For example, under the Code of Hammurabi, the ancient Babylonian code
of laws, ca. 1790 BC, a wife's rights in the event of divorce were established and
depended upon, inter alia, whose decision it was to separate, her fault in the
breakdown of the marriage, her husband's fault, and the existence of children. THE
CODE OF HAMMURABI §§ 137-41 (Robert Francis Harper trans., Univ. of Chi.




Imprudent behavior on the part of the wife could cause her to be "cast into the
water," drowning apparently being the favored treatment for women who were
blamed for marital discord. Id. §§ 139-43. Men, in contrast, were simply required
to make a monetary payment to rid themselves of an unwanted spouse. Id.
§§ 137-40.
16. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW
142-43 (3d ed. 2005) (tracing the evolution of divorce jurisdiction from the
legislature to the judiciary).
17. Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York's
Equitable Distribution Law on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 621, 626-
27(1991).
18. FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 144, 378-81.
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support bein strictly linked to freedom from blame for the marriage
breakdown.
As a result, the process of divorce, requiring a fault analysis
to determine entitlement to divorce and alimony, necessarily
developed as an adversarial process.2 0 Gradual cultural acceptance
of divorce in the United States and the enactment of no-fault statutes
eliminated the need to plead fault grounds for divorce,2 1 ushering in
a steady increase in divorce rates.22 As divorce became more
prevalent in the United States, mandating rights and obligations that
arose upon divorce, including both alimony and asset distribution,
developed as a means to prevent women, especially those with
children born during the marriage, from being thrown into poverty
when divorced by their husbands.23 New, legislatively-mandated,
complex schemes for dividing rights and obligations accruing at the
time of divorce emerged.24
19. Garrison, supra note 17, at 627.
20. In contrast, under the Code of Hammurabi, divorce typically entitled the
innocent wife to a fixed sum equal to the amount of the dowry or a specified
payment, dependent upon the status of the husband, as either a freedman or not.
THE CODE OF HAMMURABI, supra note 15, at §§ 137-40.
21. California was the first state to adopt a no-fault ground for divorce,
effective January 1, 1970. Nicholas H. Wolfinger, The Mixed Blessings of No-
Fault Divorce, 4 WHFrIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 407, 407 (2004). By 1987
all states had some form of no-fault statute. Id. at 407-08.
22. In the mid-1900s, divorce terminated approximately 5% of first marriages
in the United States. Paul R. Amato, The Consequences ofDivorce for Adults and
Children, 62 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1269, 1269 (2000). As more states followed
California's lead and adopted no fault statutes, divorce rates started a rapid climb,
until they peaked in the early-1980s with more than 50% of marriages ending in
divorce, before declining to the current divorce rate of about 50%. Wolfinger,
supra note 21, at 407. Whether the adoption of no-fault statutes caused the
increase in divorce rates is not clear, however. See Judith G. McMullen & Debra
Oswald, Why Do We Need a Lawyer?: An Empirical Study of Divorce Cases, 12
J.L. & FAM. STUD. 57, 62-63 (2010) (discussing scholarly disagreement over
whether the adoption of no-fault statutes caused the increase in divorce rates).
23. See Garrison, supra note 17, at 627-28 (discussing the progressive
adoption of equitable distribution rights as a way to acknowledge a wife's non-
monetary contributions to the marriage).
24. See generally J. Thomas Oldham, Changes in the Economic
Consequences of Divorce, 1958-2008, 42 FAM. L.Q. 419, 432-33 (2008)
(discussing how societal and legal changes affected the economic consequences of
divorce).
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Despite the adoption of no-fault statutes, most states provided
that financial awards were based on a "fault-coupled-with-rights"
approach, allowing the decision-maker wide discretion in fashioning
an appropriate outcome, emphasizing that maximizing one's rights
under relevant statutes was the desired litigation result.25 As state
legislatures carved out additional rights available to divorcing
spouses, antagonism increased, causing litigants to vie for
insufficient resources, receipt or loss of which could significantly
impact their and their children's future lifestyle and well-being.26
Although the right to a divorce is a product of state
legislative creation, asset distribution. and support laws often first
develop in courtrooms, where contentious spouses seek resolution of
"issues of first impression." 27 As these issues recur and occasionally
result in inconsistent judicial rulings, legislators codify provisions
that clarify each spouse's entitlement upon divorce.28 In some states,
entitlement to assets and support still remains conditioned on
freedom from marital fault, even though the ability to obtain a
divorce is no longer predicated upon a judicial finding of fault.29
25. See generally Marsha Garrison, How Do Judges Decide Divorce Cases?
An Empirical Analysis of Discretionary Decision Making, 74 N.C. L. REV. 401,
405 (1996) (discussing how judicial discretion leads to inconsistent results in
divorce litigation).
26. Decrease in economic status of women post-divorce is well-documented,
although experts do not agree how significantly women are impacted. See Pamela
Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recognition of Gender Difference in the Law: Revaluing
the Caretaker Role, 31 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 1, 5 n.13 (2008) (noting that studies
indicate women's decline in standard of living after divorce can range from 30% to
73%).
27. See, e.g., Piscopo v. Piscopo, 557 A.2d 1040, 1041-42 (N.J. 1989)
(finding that celebrity goodwill was a marital asset subject to equitable
distribution); Jensen v. Jensen, 824 So. 2d 315, 317-20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)
(finding that unvested stock options were subject to distribution); Monslow v.
Monslow, 900 P.2d 249, 252-53 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the value of
patents was a marital asset).
28. For example, equitable distribution was first judicially adopted in Florida
in Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1201 (Fla. 1980). It was
subsequently codified by the Florida Legislature in 1988. FLA. STAT. § 61.075
(2010).
29. Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, No-Fault Laws and At-Fault People,
18 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 325, 328 (1998).
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Logically, considering fault in financial awards makes divorce
litigation adversarial.
Much has been written about children of divorced
households, focusing on both short-term effects of divorce, as well as
those that last into adulthood.' Separate and apart from the impact
of divorce itself, studies reveal the process of divorcing causes many
long-lasting deleterious effects suffered by children when marriages
fail. 32  Most experts agree that courts are ill-equipped to resolve
30. Including fault as one of the factors in financial awards also appears to
affect the rate of divorce. One study noted that divorce rates were higher in states
where there was no consideration of fault for either granting the divorce or making
financial awards; where fault was considered, the divorce rates were lower. Id. at
340.
31. Children of divorce are twice as likely to drop out of school as those from
intact homes, three times as apt to have a baby out-of-wedlock, five times more
likely to live in poverty, and twelve times more likely to be incarcerated. Barry
Maley, The Damage Done by the Decline of Marriage, THE AGE, Dec. 8, 2001
(Austl.), reprinted in Opinion and Commentary, THE CENTRE FOR INDEP. STUD.,
http://www.cis.org.au/media-information/opinion-pieces/article/1437-the-damage-
done-by-the-decline-of-marriage (last visited Oct. 22, 2010). The quadrupling of
the rate of suicides among young adult males in Australia over a forty year period
may also be associated, at least in part, with the prevalence of divorce. Id. In
addition, Judith Wallerstein's landmark, twenty-five-year study of 100 children of
divorced families revealed that 60% of those aged 27-43 had married, while 84%
of those from intact families had done so. JUDITH WALLERSTEIN, THE
UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF DIVORCE 329 (2000). Of the children from divorced
families who had married, 42% had already divorced. Id. These results caused Dr.
Wallerstein to conclude that the effects of divorce linger into the adulthoods of
these children, shaping their interpersonal relationships and psychological well-
being. Id. at xxvii-xxx.
32. See Marsha Kline Pruett & Tamara D. Jackson, The Lawyer's Role
During the Divorce Process: Perceptions of Parents, Their Young Children, and
Their Attorneys, 33 FAM. L.Q. 283, 285 (1999) (citing research that suggests
children shoulder psychological burdens as a result of divorce litigation). Experts
estimate that 15/6-30% of divorce cases can be characterized as high-conflict
cases. Tonya Inman, Patricia Carter, & John P. Vincent, High-Conflict Divorce:
Legal And Psychological Challenges, Hous. LAW. (Mar.-Apr. 2008),
http://www.thehoustonlawyer.com/aa mar08/page24.htm (relying on ELEANOR E.
MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL
DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY (1992) and Paul R. Amato, Laura Spencer Loomis & Alan
Booth, Parental Divorce, Marital Conflict, and Offspring Well-Being During
Early Adulthood, 73 Soc. FORCES 895, 895-915 (1995)). Children whose families
have gone through high-conflict divorces "are two to four times more likely to
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disputes related to children of divorcing parents. 33  Acrimonious
litigation polarizes parents, making co-parenting difficult. 34  The
cost of litigation depletes valuable family resources needed to
support two households post-divorce to provide for children's
needs.35
Beyond the negative impact of the adversarial divorce
process on the family unit, legal practitioners representing divorcing
spouses have expressed increasing dissatisfaction with the
contentious nature of divorce litigation. 36 In addition, parties have
physically confronted lawyers and judges presiding over divorce
cases, sometimes injuring or killing them.37 Of lawyers murdered by
exhibit clinically significant emotional, behavioral and academic difficulties."
Inman, Carter & Vincent, supra at 24.
33. See generally JOHNSTON & ROSEBY, supra note 5 (observing that high-
conflict divorces coupled with scarce court resources jeopardize the emotional
health of children involved); Gregory Firestone & Janet Weinstein, In the Best
Interests of Children: A Proposal to Transform the Adversarial System, 42 FAM.
CT. REv. 203 (2004) (examining the shortcomings of the current adversarial
system in protecting the best interests of children).
34. Robert H. Mnookin & Eleanor Maccoby, Facing the Dilemmas of Child
Custody, 10 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 54, 62 (2002).
35. See Linda D. Elrod & Milfred D. Dale, Paradigm Shifts and Pendulum
Swings in Child Custody: The Interests of Children in the Balance, 42 FAM. L.Q.
381, 384 (2008) ("High-conflict parents . . . deplete their own personal and
financial resources.").
36. See BERNARD S. MAYER, BEYOND NEUTRALITY: CONFRONTING THE
CRISIS IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION 67 (2004) (identifying frustrations that lawyers
and other court-annexed experts feel with outcomes produced by the structure of
the system); Julie MacFarlane, Experiences of Collaborative Law: Preliminary
Results from the Collaborative Lawyering Research Project, 2004 J. DIsP. RESOL.
179, 181 (2004) (explaining that disillusionment and burnout among family law
practitioners are effects of working in an adversarial environment); Elizabeth K.
Strickland, Putting "Counselor" Back in the Lawyer's Job Description: Why More
States Should Adopt Collaborative Law Statutes, 84 N.C. L. REv. 979, 980 (2006)
("The adversarial nature of divorce litigation negatively affects children, couples,
and disillusioned practitioners.").
37. See Stephen Kelson, Violence Against Lawyers: The Increasingly
Attacked Professions, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 260, 264 (2001) ("Lawyers are in a
profession that normally requires them to deal with conflict on a daily basis, and
for that reason the occurrence of violence is always a possibility."); see generally
Avi Salzman, When the Courtroom Can't Contain a Divorce Case, N.Y. TIMES,
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clients or opposing parties, divorce attorneys have the dubious honor
of being the ones most likely to be victimized.38 The need for
avenues other than litigation to resolve family disputes is obvious
and more state legislatures and courts are giving trial judges wide
latitude to impose sanctions against parties, as well as their counsel,
who engage in unnecessary litigation and foment acrimonious
conduct.
To counteract the documented negative sociological,
psychological, and financial impact of the divorce process, removal
of divorce from the adversarial arena is a logical alternative.40
Lawyers have means available outside courtrooms to resolve
disputes and reduce the negative impact on litigants and their
children, who are innocent bystanders. As discussed below,
however, current ADR methods do not adequately address the
June 26, 2005, at CTI (describing several incidents of serious physical violence
against divorce lawyers).
38. See Kelson, supra note 37, at 264 ("The most volatile area appears to be
the domestic forum.").
39. E.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 271 (2004) (authorizing an award of attorney's
fees and costs when a party or counsel's lack of cooperation exacerbates costly
litigation and "frustrates the policy of the law to motivate settlement of litigation");
Wrona v. Wrona, 592 So. 2d 694, 697 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (authorizing
Florida trial courts to take steps to avoid unnecessary expenses during divorce
proceedings); Mettler v. Mettler, 569 So. 2d 496, 498 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(imposing attorney's fees on appellant because her conduct "unnecessarily
engendered recalcitrant or vexatious litigation and served to frustrate . . . public
policy. . . to promote settlement of litigation and where possible to reduce the cost
of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys").
40. See Joan B. Kelly, Issues Facing the Family Mediation Field, 1 PEPP.
DIsP. RESOL. L.J. 37, 37 (2000) (suggesting divorce mediation arose from
dissatisfaction with effects of adversarial system); Jane C. Murphy, Revitalizing
the Adversary System in Family Law, 78 U. CIN. L. REv. 891, 895 (2010)
(highlighting the call by reformers to abandon the adversarial system in favor of an
extra-judicial approach). Divorce statutes, however, provide the very basis for the
acrimonious nature of rights-based litigation. Lawyers are in the difficult position
of being zealous advocates seeking to maximize their clients' statutory rights,
while also being mindful that such advocacy may result in psychological,
emotional, and financial harm to the clients and their children. The impact that
adoption of detailed divorce statutes identifying and defining new rights and
obligations has on the litigious nature of the divorce process is beyond the scope of
this article, but could be the basis for an interesting retrospective empirical study.
254 [Vol. 30:2
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unique issues presented in divorce actions and fail to fulfill parties'
needs for procedural and substantive justice.
III. EXISTING ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION METHODS
FAIL TO MEET DIVORCE LITIGANTS' NEEDS FOR PROCEDURAL
AND SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE, EFFICIENCY, AND COST-
EFFECTIVENESS
ADR methods have been touted as the remedy for reducing
animosity between divorcing parties and lessening the negative
impact that extended litigation has on children, as well as on
41parents. In order to reduce damaging litigation and recidivistic
modification and enforcement actions that so often accompany
marital breakdowns, ADR experts emphasize that a shift from rights-
based approaches for settling disputes to interest-based resolutions42
is required.43
Litigation, however, provides parties with psychic benefits
not found in existing ADR methods and is consistent with a rights-
based approach that divorce statutes embody. There are six needs
that arguably are met through litigation that are not satisfied through
ADR methods: (1) Voice-appearing in a courtroom allows a
litigant to be heard; (2) Procedural Justice-litigants believe the
judicial process affords them a fair and just method for resolving
disputes; (3) Vindication-beyond providing a resolution, a trial
determines who is right or wrong; (4) Validation-beyond being
vindicated, litigants desire for their feelings, such as hurt or anger, to
be acknowledged and deemed justifiable; (5) Impact-litigants
wants to perceive that they have an impact on their personal situation
as well as on the greater social good; and (6) Safety-because
41. See Kelly, supra note 40, at 37 (suggesting anticipated benefits of divorce
mediation include less conflict during and after the divorce process, more parent
communication and cooperation post-divorce, and greater client satisfaction with
both process and outcome).
42. Some conflict resolution experts refer to this as a "needs-based" approach
because "the essence of this approach is a commitment to understanding conflict
and negotiation in terms of the needs people have that are motivating them and that
must be addressed for them to be satisfied with the progress of a conflict process."
MAYER, supra note 36, at 35.
43. Id. at 35-36.
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conflict is often viewed as risky, litigants can prefer to seek out the
safety that formal rules and procedures of a courtroom provide.44 To
encourage litigant acceptance of, and participation in, ADR
processes, these needs should not be ignored.
Traditional law school education focuses primarily on
litigation as the means for resolving disputes and offers minimal
training in ADR methods.45 Consequently, with clients often averse
to eschewing the courtroom in favor of utilizing ADR methods, and
lawyers predisposed to an educationally-ingrained litigation
preference, attorneys practicing marital and family law may not
voluntarily embrace alternative methods to litigation.46 Despite this
44. Id. at 23-28.
45. See Mary E. O'Connell & J. Herbie DiFonzo, The Family Law Education
Reform Project Final Report, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 524, 527-28 (2006) (noting that
traditional class curriculum and methods do not address the nature of
contemporary family law).
46. The call for law schools to better train lawyers in problem-solving
methods dates back to at least the MacCrate Report in 1992. A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL
EDUC. ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL
DEVELOPMENT, MACCRATE REPORT, AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF
THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP
ch. 7B (1992), available at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/publications/onlinepubs/
maccrate.html. The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching's
report of its two-year study of legal education and Best Practices for Legal
Education: A Vision and a Road Map both highlight the need for more skills-based
training in law schools to provide new lawyers with the tools necessary to address
modern legal issues and client needs. ROY STUCKEY, BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL
EDUCATION: A VISION AND A ROAD MAP 7 (2007); WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL.,
EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 14 (2007).
While many law schools offer diverse programs in litigation skills, few offer
intensive training or clinical programs focusing on ways to resolve disputes
without resorting to litigation. See Kimberlee K. Kovach, The Vanishing Trial:
Land Mine on the Mediation Landscape or Opportunity for Evolution:
Ruminations on the Future ofMediation Practice, 7 CARDOzO J. CONFLICT RESOL.
27, 55-56 (2005) (discussing that mediation clinics and training programs are still
subsumed by the traditional adversarial framework within law school curricula).
Law schools do not equip their clientele-future lawyers-to deal with the
emotional and psychological issues often present in litigation, especially in family
law matters. O'Connell & DiFonzo, supra note 45, at 524, 528. The casebook
method, as the name suggests, consists of reading legal cases that have been
resolved by judges. See id. at 527-28 ("[M]ost of the books used to teach family
law emphasize litigated appellate cases, virtually to the exclusion of everything
else."). The message students receive is that litigation is the accepted method for
resolving disputes; judges enforce, and in some instances create, the law that is
256 [ Vol. 30:2
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bias towards litigation, 4 7 the majority of cases, marital as well as
other civil matters, settle without a trial, and many of those
settlements are achieved using ADR methods.48
used to resolve client disputes; and if a client is unhappy with the result, an
appellate court may correct any errors that occurred. See id ("The negative effect
of the texts' case law emphasis is that it subliminally conveys the message that
what matters most in family law is what gets litigated."). If the legal culture is to
change such that ADR is no longer considered an "alternative" method of
resolving disputes, but becomes the "preferred" method for handling client
disputes, then change must not start with the lawyers who have witnessed the
devastating effects of litigation. It must begin in law schools, before the newly
admitted members to the bar resort to litigation because that is what has been
ingrained in them during their law school years. Students must not just learn how
to "think like lawyers," but also must be taught to act as diplomats.
The standard conception of the lawyer's role has two basic principles or
ideals: the principles of nonaccountability and the principle of partisan
professionalism. The principle of nonaccountability states that a lawyer
is not morally accountable for the means used to advocate for a client, nor
for the ends pursued. The principle of partisan professionalism states that
while serving as an advocate, a lawyer must, within recognized
constraints of legality or professional ethics, seek to maximize the
likelihood that a client will prevail. Together, these principles form the
basis of how most lawyers view their work and their ethics: a lawyer is a
partisan and zealous advocate, dedicated to the client's cause, and
absolved of responsibility for that cause and its pursuit, so long as the
lawyer acts within the bounds of the law. He or she is an amoral
gladiator.
Scott R. Peppet, Lawyer's Bargaining Ethics, Contract, and Collaboration:
The End of the Legal Profession and the Beginning of Professional Pluralism, 90
IOWA L. REV. 475, 500 (2005) (citations omitted). See generally John Lande &
Jean R. Stemlight, The Potential Contribution of ADR to an Integrated
Curriculum: Preparing Law Students for Real World Lawyering, 25 OHIo ST. J. ON
DisP. RESOL. 247 (2010) (encouraging greater incorporation of ADR into law
school curricula).
47. The reticence to use ADR methods is not exclusively related to the
litigation preference, but can also be based on concerns about the efficacy of such
processes. Extra-judicial conflict resolution experts have identified three general
types of criticisms leveled against ADR methods, separately, as well as
collectively: (1) "political or policy-based" arguments claim that ADR methods
may hinder social and institutional goals aimed at the distribution of power; (2)
criticism of the "efficiency or effectiveness" of the processes questions whether
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By far, the most prevalent alternative to litigation used by
family lawyers is mediation.49 In many states, mediation has become
a mandatory precursor to trial,50 largely due to its success in
resolving disputes. Litigants often are dissatisfied with mediation,
however, despite its position as the ADR method of choice.5 1 In
many jurisdictions, mediation results in cases being settled without
the benefit of legal advice; counsel are often not present and the
mediator is generally prohibited from offering legal opinions. 52
Parties who settle cases at mediation, then, are often ill-informed
about their legal rights and obligations before committing themselves
to an agreement. Overall, these process shortcomings make
mediation an ADR method that is not entirely successful in
satisfying the six client needs that are met through litigation.53
Following an analysis of key benefits and shortcomings of
mediation, this paper will critique collaborative law, a newcomer to
the ADR arena. Collaborative law has gained ground with some
attorneys and has spawned new statutes permitting the process in at
practical considerations of time, effort, and utilization of financial resources
expose the flaws in ADR principles; and (3) "experiential- or personal-based"
criticism flows from the participants' experiences in the processes. MAYER, supra
note 36, at 42-43.
48. ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING,
COUNSELING AND NEGOTIATION SKILLS FOR EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION 341
(1990). Although estimates vary, approximately 95% of cases are reported to have
settled without a trial. Frank E.A. Sander, The Future of ADR, 2000 J. DISP.
RESOL. 3, 5 (2000).
49. See Kelly, supra note 40, at 37 ("In the past decade, family mediation has
emerged as a major dispute resolution process . . . ."); John Lande & Gregg
Herman, Fitting the Forum to the Family Fuss: Choosing Mediation,
Collaborative Law, or Cooperative Law for Negotiating Divorce Cases, 42 FAM.
CT. REV. 280, 280 (2004) ("In many places, mediation has become the most
common procedure for resolving family disputes in litigation.").
50. Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Mediation Exceptionality, 78 FORDHAM L.
REv. 1247, 1253 (2009).
51. See discussion infra Part III.A (describing how mediation can result in
agreements made without informed consent).
52. Id.
53. See supra text accompanying note 44 (listing the six needs met through
litigation).
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least three states.54 Virtually every state lacking a statute or
procedural rule that permits or governs the practice has volunta 7
collaborative law groups promoting the use of the procedure.
Significant concerns about potential ethical implications of
collaborative law and the coercive effect it has on litigants,56
however, also make this ADR method an inadequate alternative for
most divorcing couples. Because collaborative law relies on four-
way meetings between only the parties and their counsel, the general
lack of third-party involvement indicates that, again, certain needs
satisfied through litigation, such as validation and vindication,5 7 will
not be satisfied.
A. The Typical Mediation Paradigm Can Result in
Agreements Lacking Informed Consent
Restrictions imposed on mediators, lack of participation of
counsel,5 9 and insufficient discovery60 often result in parties entering
into mediation agreements with inadequate knowledge of statutorily-
imposed rights and responsibilities. Mediation can divest parties of
the ability to make informed decisions to waive rights and accept
obligations not otherwise mandated by statute. Parties may
voluntarily elect to enter into agreements containing such provisions,
but doing so with inadequate information results in a denial of
procedural and substantive justice. Before examining these
shortcomings of mediation, a general discussion of the typical
mediation process may be helpful.
Most mediation models used in civil litigation of any type are
centered on the concept that it is an informal, non-adversarial,
confidential process controlled by a neutral third-party who has no
54. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2013 (2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-70 to 50-79
(2009); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.603 (West 2006).
55. See Christopher M. Fairman, Growing Pains: Changes in Collaborative
Law and the Challenge ofLegal Ethics, 30 CAMPBELL L. REv. 237, 239-40 (2008)
("Collaborative law practice groups exist in virtually every state in the nation.").
56. See discussion infra Part III.B. 1.
57. See supra text accompanying note 44.
58. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.
59. See discussion infra Part III A.2.
60. See discussion infra Part III A.2.
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stake in the litigation.61 Divorce mediation, now commonly
provided for by statute or rule in many states, is promoted as a
method to empower parties to resolve marital disputes without
lengthy and costly litigation.62 The Model Standards of Practice for
Family and Divorce Mediation describes the process:
Family and divorce mediation is a process in which a
mediator, an impartial third party, facilitates the
resolution of family disputes by promoting the
participants' voluntary agreement. The family
mediator assists communication, encourages
understanding and focuses the participants on their
individual and common interests. The family
mediator works with the participants to explore
options, make decisions and reach their own
agreements. 63
Consequently, the typical family mediation paradigm shifts
the focus from rights-based litigation, deemed so harmful to
participants in divorce proceedings, to an interest-based analysis of
"win-win" alternatives likely to meet each party's and the children's
individual and collective needs post-divorce.64
Many practitioners claim, anecdotally, that divorcing couples
who successfully resolve their disputes through mediation enjoy
improved long-term relationships. 65 Empirical studies support these
predictions:
61. Lande & Herman, supra note 49, at 280.
62. See O'Connell & DiFonzo, supra note 45, at 532 (detailing the increased
use of mediation to resolve family law disputes).
63. THE SYMPOSIUM ON STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, ASSOCIATION OF FAMILY
AND CONCILIATION COURTS, MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMiLY AND
DIVORCE MEDIATION 1 (2000), available at http://www.afccnet.org/
pdfs/modelstandards.pdf (last visited Sept. 17, 2010) [hereinafter DIVORCE
MEDIATION STANDARDS].
64. See Lande & Herman, supra note 49, at 282 ("Mediation often uses an
interest-based approach to negotiation in which the parties explicitly identify their
interests and select options maximizing the interests of both parties.").
65. MAYER, supra note 36, at 58.
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The anticipation was that the divorce mediation
process, provided by trained, competent mediators,
would result in less conflict during and after the
divorce process, more parent communication and
cooperation post divorce, and significantly greater
client satisfaction with both the process as well as the
outcome. Further, it was expected that the negotiated
outcomes would not disadvantage either party as
compared to the outcomes of couples using the
traditional adversarial divorce process. These
expectations have generally been supported and
replicated by empirical research in five countries
assessing divorce and custody mediation processes. 6 6
Mediation process features are similar even though
requirements differ among states having statutory or procedural rules
governing mediation. Scholars have explored the role of mediators
and counsel during mediation,6 7 professional organizations have
developed mediation standards, 68 and the American Bar Association
approved a Uniform Mediation Act. 69  These have served to
homogenize the mediation process.
Parties can voluntarily participate in mediation prior to
commencing litigation,70 but mediation is used more frequently once
an action is pending; it can be the result of court mandate or
66. Kelly, supra note 40, at 38 (citations omitted).
67. See, e.g., Craig A. McEwen, Nancy H. Rogers & Richard J. Maiman,
Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring
Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1317, 1351-55, 1375-94 (1995)
(finding that lawyers present in mediations do not spoil the mediation's capacity to
reach settlement).
68. E.g., MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (2005), available
at http://www.abanet.org/dispute/news/ModelStandardsofConductforMediators
final05.pdf; DIVORCE MEDIATION STANDARDS, supra note 63.
69. The Act was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (now the Uniform Law Commission) in August 2001 and
approved by the American Bar Association in February 2002. UNIFORM
MEDIATION ACT (2003), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/
ulc/mediat/2003finaldraft.htm.
70. Fran L. Tetunic, Florida Mediation Case Law: Two Decades of
Maturation, 28 NOVA L. REV. 87, 135 (2003).
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voluntary election.7  Often, the impetus for scheduling mediation is
receipt of the court order mandating the parties to appear. 72 Even
when attendance at mediation is ordered by a court, participation is
deemed voluntary because compulsion to settle is absent. Once
parties have appeared, they cannot be compelled to continue to
mediate issues, absent a court order requiring further participation in
the process.74
Confidentiality cloaks all discussions that occur at mediation;
parties, their counsel, and the mediator cannot disclose the matters
addressed, offers of settlement made and rejected, or a party's
willingness, or lack thereof, to engage in meaningful settlement
discussions.75  The confidentiality requirement is seen as the
cornerstone of mediation, intended to permit parties freedom to
discuss all available alternatives and make concessions without fear
that good-heartedness at mediation could be used against them in
subsequent litigation if the matter is not resolved.76
Proponents of mediation in divorce actions claim the process
permits parties to exercise more control over the resolution of their
divorce, creating individualized results that increase the likelihood of
71. See Murphy, supra note 40, at 906 (noting that attorneys do not usually
suggest mediation as a viable option unless there is a court mandate).
72. Id.
73. John Lande, Why a Good-Faith Requirement is a Bad Idea for Mediation,
23 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 1, 1 (2005).
74. See generally id. (discussing the level of participation required during
mediation).
75. The confidentiality requirement is codified in most mediation state
statutes. See generally SARAH R. COLE, CRAIG A. MCEwEN & NANCY H. ROGERS,
MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE § 9.11 (2009) (discussing statutory
mediation confidentiality provisions). The Uniform Mediation Act prohibits the
mediator and all those present during mediation from disclosing matters discussed
at mediation and in mediation communications, except matters that may relate to
prospective criminal acts, abuse of minors or the elderly, or in defense of
professional negligence or misconduct claims. UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT, supra
note 69, at §§ 4-6, 8.
76. See Tetunic, supra note 70, at 91 (arguing that the confidentiality
requirement is necessary to promote settlements through trust-building, candor,
neutrality, information-sharing, and problem-solving). This protection may be
artificial, however; once factual information is disclosed during mediation it will
become the subject of legitimate discovery that can be used in the litigation. Id. at
104.
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compliance.7 7  Studies indicate family law mediation reduces the
cost of divorce actions.7 8  When mediation is mandated by statute or
procedural rule, mediation sessions tend to occur earlier in the
litigation process, further reducing costs, and clients may be more
receptive to the process.79
Early mediation does not always occur in family law cases,
however, causing critics to challenge its usefulness.8 0  Some cases
may proceed to mediation after parties have expended large sums
and discovery is well underway, often nearly or actually complete,
and a trial date is looming. As a result, the litigation has often
proceeded at a steadily rising level of acrimony because pleadings,
motions, and discovery requests have been filed, solidifying the
parties' positions, making compromise difficult and a post-divorce
amicable relationship between the parties unlikely.82
Despite the popularity of mediation as an ADR method for
settling divorce cases, the issues that can be resolved through family
77. Janet A. Flaccus, Mediation of Divorce Disputes-Is This the Solution?,
2009 ARK. L. NOTES 79, 80 (2009). Whether it is mediation that results in the
higher rates of compliance or the fact that those amenable to resolving their
disputes extra-judicially are also more likely to abide by their agreements is not
clear, however. MAYER, supra note 36, at 56.
78. See, e.g., Christopher Kane, Collaborative Divorce Costs Less,
DIVORCENET.COM,
http://www.divorcenet.com/states/washington/collaborative divorce-costs-less
(last visited Sept. 15, 2010) (discussing survey results of 199 divorce cases
handled by Boston Law Cooperative members, indicating average cost of divorce
mediation was $6,600).
79. See, e.g., Michaela Keet, The Evolution of Lawyers' Roles in Mandatory
Mediation: A Condition of Systemic Transformation, 68 SASK. L. REV. 313, 314
(2005); see also Nathan S. Bracken, Book Note: Providing a Comprehensive View
of Family Mediation Divorce and Family Mediation: Models, Techniques, and
Applications, 7 J. L. FAM. STUD. 217, 225 (indicating that Canada's "relative
political and cultural similarity" to the United States allows the inference that a
mediation system that works in Canada could be applied successfully in the United
States).
80. PAULINE H. TESLER, COLLABORATIVE LAW: ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE
RESOLUTION IN DIVORCE WITHOUT LITIGATION 1-2 (2d ed. 2008).
81. See, e.g., FORREST S. MOSTEN, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO MEDIATION
245-47 (1997) (discussing the level of discovery necessary prior to mediation).
82. See John Lande, How Will Lawyering and Mediation Practices Transform
Each Other?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 839, 886-88 (1997) (discussing the
involvement of lawyers in mediation and the time pressure that it might add).
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mediation,83 the structure of the mediation process, 84 and mediator
training requirements are not uniform. Every state now has either
statutory or procedural requirements related to mediation; however,
several do not have mediation guidelines specific to family law. 86
83. For example, in North Carolina, mediation is mandatory for all custody
and visitation issues, unless the court waives the requirement for good cause;
alimony, child support, and other economic issues cannot be mediated. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-13.1(b)(c) (2009). In Arkansas, the court can either require the parties
to mediate child-related issues or attend two hours of parenting classes. ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-12-322(a) (2009). By contrast, in Wisconsin, issues relating to
custody may be mediated pursuant to court order; absent agreement of the parties,
matters relating to property division, support, and child support may not be
considered unless directly related to the custody issues. Wis. STAT. § 767.405(9)
(2009). In addition, many court-affiliated mediation programs handle only child-
related issues; in contrast, private mediators tend to offer full-range services to
resolve all divorce-related issues. MAYER, supra note 36, at 70.
84. See Lande & Herman, supra note 49, at 282 (discussing the issues with
the process of mediation).
85. At least twenty-six states provide for specific mediator training programs,
although in some states the parties can agree to use a mediator who has not
completed a program: Alabama (in cases involving domestic violence), ALA.
CODE § 6-6-20(f)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2010 legis. session); Alaska (in cases
involving domestic violence), ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.080(g)(2) (2008); California,
CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 1815-1816 & CAL. R. CT. 5.210(f) (West 2004); Florida, FLA.
R. CIV. P. 1.720(f)(1); Idaho, IDAHO R. CIV. P. 16(j)(6)(b)-(c); Illinois, ILL. SUP.
CT. R. 905; Indiana, IND. CT. R. A.D.R. 2.5; Iowa, IOWA CT. R. 11.1; Kansas,
KAN. SUP. CT. R. 902(B)(3); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:334 (2008);
Maryland, MD. R. ADR R. 17-104, 17-106 (2009); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 552.513(4) (West 2005); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.619(4)(d)
(West 2006); Missouri, Mo. R. CIv. P. 88.05; Nebraska, NEB. SUP. CT.,
STANDARDS OF PRAC. AND ETHICS FOR FAM. MEDIATORS, STANDARD II; Nevada,
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 3.475(2)(c), 3.500(2)(c) (2009); New Hampshire, N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §328-C (LexisNexis 2003); New York, N.Y. CT. R. § 146.4-146.5;
North Carolina, N.C. SUP. CT. R. 8(A)-(D) available at
http://www.nccourts.org/courts/crs/councils/drc/msc/rules.asp; North Dakota, N.D.
R. CT. 8.9(b)(3), 8.9(d); Oklahoma, (in cases involving domestic violence), 12
OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 1825(A)(2) (Supp. 2010); Oregon, OJD MEDIATOR COURT-
CONNECTED QUALIFICATIONS R. 3.2; South Carolina, S.C. CT. R. REG. A.D.R.
16(b); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-58.1(2) (2004); Tennessee (in
cases involving domestic violence), TENN. CODE. ANN. §§ 36-6-107(a)(2), 36-4-
131(d)(1)(B) (2005); Vermont, VT. SUP. CT. 42 ADMIN. ORD. QUALIFICATIONS OF
PARENTING COORDINATORS R. 3; Virginia, VA. CODE ANN § 8.01-576.8 (2007);
and Wisconsin, WiS. STAT. ANN. § 767.405(4) (2009).
86. For example, Mississippi, New York, and Wyoming have procedural
rules addressing mediation, without specific reference to family law mediation.
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Regardless of state procedural differences, a neutral, third-
party mediator always controls the process. The role of the mediator
as a neutral party, who offers no insight into potential litigation
outcomes, is one aspect of mediation that fails to satisfy the needs of
participants." In addition, attorneys for the parties are not always
active participants in the process, which leads to another criticism of
family mediation. At times lawyers are wholly excluded from the
process, or only serve a post-settlement-review function.89
Generally, only when attorneys are either actively or peripherally
involved is at least some discovery undertaken prior to settlement
through mediation. 90 Absent discovery, and, often, legal advice,
parties enter into agreements during mediation with little knowledge
of their legal rights and obligations. Thus, mediation agreements
often lack informed consent.
1. Use of a Neutral, Non-Family Law-Trained
Mediator Ignores the Rights-Based Nature of
Divorce
Some mediators lack specialized training in mediation
techniques in marital and family law,91 which is an area
characterized by complex statutory systems involving apportionment
of rights and obligations. Absent such knowledge, a mediator may
be wholly unaware of potential issues that arise upon divorce and
could facilitate execution of an agreement that creates unanticipated
consequences. 92 In addition, the concept of a neutral mediator is
Miss. R. CT. ANNEXED MEDIATION CIv. LIT.; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS., tit.
22, § 146 (2008); WYo. R. Civ. P. 40.
87. See supra text accompanying note 44.
88. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
89. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
90. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
91. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of
its Own: Conflicts Among Dispute Professionals, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1871, 1925
(1997) (explaining that some, but not all, mediators have extensive training in
mediation).
92. For example, divorce cases often involve issues related to alimony and
child support, which can create potential tax ramifications for the parties. See 26
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contrary to the perceived needs of litigants, who seek guidance and
information during the mediation process.
Many states have adopted rules regulating educational
qualifications and training required for "certified" mediators; 9 3 none
have apparently prohibited individuals lacking this background from
actively marketing themselves to the public as mediators, nor are
there any national standards governing mediator qualifications. 94
Persons lacking any knowledge of statutory principles governing
divorce actions or the psychological and financial ramifications of
divorce can mediate cases for parties who also lack expertise.
Most mediators actively soliciting divorce clients, however,
are attorneys practicing marital and family law, retired judges who
previously presided over these cases, or mental health professionals
who treat divorcing individuals and families. 95 When serving as
mediators, attorneys and judges having legal expertise in the law are
generally constrained from opining about the merits of either party's
positions or predicting a likely outcome if the matters were
U.S.C. § 71 (2006) (mandating specific treatment of alimony and child support
payments for tax purposes). A mediator unversed in divorce-related tax provisions
could facilitate a settlement causing an unanticipated financial impact.
93. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1825 (West Supp. 2010) (requiring
family and divorce mediators to be certified pursuant to the Dispute Resolution
Act; to complete forty hours of training and conduct a specified number of hours
of mediation; or to have regularly engaged in family and divorce mediation
practice for at least four years); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, Ch. 37, App. R. 11
(West 2010) (providing for initial and continuing qualification as a mediator); FLA.
R. CERT. & CT.-APPOINTED MEDIATORS 10.100-10.130 (2003) (setting forth
requirements for Florida Supreme Court certification as a mediator).
94. The Uniform Mediation Act, Sec. 2(3), adopted by ten states and the
District of Columbia, defines a mediator as "an individual who conducts a
mediation." UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT, supra note 69, § 2(3). The official
comments indicate that "the Act does not require that a mediator have a special
qualification by background or profession." Id. § 2(3) cmt. 3. A mediator may be
required, however, to "disclose the mediator's qualifications to mediate a dispute,"
but only if requested by one of the participants. Id. § 9(c).
95. See Timothy Lohmar, Heidi Gryte & Amy Markel, Student Projects, A
Survey of Domestic Mediator Qualifications and Suggestions for a Uniform
Paradigm, 1998 J. Disp. RESOL. 217, 222-26 (1998) (discussing educational and
experiential qualifications considered relevant to the practice of family mediation).
WE CAN WORK IT OUT
litigated.96 Notwithstanding the fact that they are lawyers, they are
prohibited from explaining the law or providing any form of legal
advice to the parties, and no attorney-client relationship exists.97
Similarly, mental health professionals serving as mediators do not
act as diagnostician, therapist, or counselor during the mediation
process.98
Some mediation experts suggest that the professional training
and experience of the mediator, however, contribute greatly to the
successful mediator's ability to listen effectively to the interests and
needs of the parties, convey information, and develop and articulate
alternatives for resolving claims. 99 Experience in using non-verbal
and verbal communication, including eye contact, voice inflection,
and voice tone to express empathy, non-judgmental concern, and
96. See Matthew Daiker, No J.D. Required The Critical Role and
Contributions of Non-Lawyer Mediators, 24 REV. LITIG. 499, 508 (2005)
(explaining "the mediator encourages the parties to generate and analyze possible
options for resolution," but does not offer recommendations or give her opinion).
There are two types of commonly used mediation-facilitative, where "mediators
attempt to create an environment where the conflicting parties can reach a
mutually agreeable solution[,]" id., and evaluative, where "mediators help the
parties come to an agreement by highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of each
party's case ... [and offering] opinions, advice, and analysis concerning the issues
of the dispute." Id. at 510. In a third type of mediation, transformative, "the
mediator strives to foster a foundational change in how the parties deal with the
dispute and with each other, leading to the possibility that the parties' relationship
will be transformed as the mediation progresses." Id. at 509. Using mediation as a
process to transform the parties' relationship has been criticized, however. Keet,
supra note 79, at 321-22. For additional comparisons of the different approaches
to mediation, see generally John Lande, Stop Bickering! A Call for Collaboration,
16 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 1 (1998). Most mediator training courses
focus on the facilitative form of mediation. D. Zumeta, Styles of Mediation:
Facilitative, Evaluative and Transformative Mediation, MEDIATE.COM (Oct. 20,
2010, 2:47 PM), http://www.mediateco.com/articles/zumeta.cfm.
97. David C. Hesser & Elizabeth Jarrell Craig, Team Mediation: An
Interdisciplinary Model Balancing Mediation in the "Matrix, " 7 PEPP. DiSP.
RESOL. L.J. 113, 117 n.30 (2007).
98. See id. at 116 (discussing the role of mental health professionals as
mediators).
99. See DOUGLAS N. FRENKEL & JAMES H. STARK, THE PRACTICE OF
MEDIATION 14-15, 144-46 (2008) (stressing the importance of good listening and
communication skills).
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impartiality are thought to empower the parties to resolve their
disputes.100
Unlike lawyer-centered negotiations, mediation is controlled
by the neutral mediator who lacks any decision-making power, 01 but
rather assists the parties in exploring available options for resolution
after establishing guidelines for the process itself.102 The typical
mediation commences with an opening statement by the mediator,
during which the mediator may explain her qualifications and ground
rules for the session.' 03 Some mediation sessions proceed with all
parties present in the same room throughout the process;' 04 others
may involve only separate caucus sessions between the mediator and
each party (and the party's counsel, if present). In those situations,
the mediator engages in "shuttle diplomacy," moving between the
parties with offers and counter-offers. 05  Mediations generally
involve some combination of joint and individual caucus sessions.10 6
During these individual and joint sessions, the mediator's role is to
help the parties identify the issues, frame each party's interests, and
develop an agenda for the mediation.107
During a caucus session, the mediator may explore that
party's primary goals and the reasons for these goals, test the
likelihood of success, and discuss alternatives to the stated goals. 0 8
These individual sessions also allow the party to vent to someone
without any interest in the outcome of the matter. This opportunity
to vent serves a cathartic purpose and can reduce a party's need to
"have his day in court"109 by fulfilling the needs for validation and
voice.110 Mediators believe that the impression created during
mediation-that someone is listening to the party's plight,
100. See id. at 145 ("Listening for empathy requires that the mediator put
herself in a nonjudgmental 'believing' mode.").
101. Daiker, supra note 96, at 503.
102. Id. at 504.
103. FRENKEL & STARK, supra note 99, at 128.
104. See id. at 193-95 (recommending that "mediators try to develop
information in joint session, rather than caucus, to the maximum extent possible.").
105. Id. at 247-49.
106. See id. at 195-98 (noting that after an information caucus mediators
should decide whether to continue with an individual caucus or a joint session).
107. Id. at 200-15.
108. Id. at 195-97, 247-49.
109. Id. at 154-55.
110. See supra text accompanying note 44.
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empathizes with the situation, and is there to help-can mollify the
parties and eliminate the need for revenge or vindication, seen as
obtainable only through a judicially-determined outcome.111
However, impartiality of the mediator throughout this
negotiation process, which is deemed to be one of the key features of
mediation, is often inconsistent with litigants' views of the role
mediators should serve. 112 One ADR expert noted this disconnect
between those who work in the ADR field and those utilizing their
services:
The underlying assumptions current in [mediation
practice] about what people want in conflict may
reflect the class, ethnicity, and privileged status of the
dominant groups in our field. For example, the
concepts of neutrality and impartiality that we
commonly rely on to describe our role and establish
our credibility are grounded in a particular cultural
context.
When people do turn to conflict resolvers,
they often want approaches that are out of sync with
the articulated values of the field. People often want
advice, recommendations, and evaluations of their
case; assistance in persuading others; or vindication
of their actions and positions. Often disputants more
readily look to people with power or a history of
power to assist them, even if these people are neither
trained in conflict resolution nor credible as neutrals.
In this respect, the needs of people or institutions in
conflict may be contradictory to or at least very
different from the values and ideologies of conflict
resolution practitioners." 3
111. See Kovach, supra note 46, at 65 (explaining that because mediation
allows the participants to focus on solving the problem, the parties stop seeing
each other as opponents and may start listening to one another).
112. MAYER, supra note 36, at 6, 69.
113. Id. at 6. Mayer's statement that mediators view neutrality as one of the
most valued components of the mediation process is supported by a survey of
family mediators in Canada. Of the 250 mediators who were part of the study, the
"most frequently cited . . . mediator characteristics [were] neutrality, impartiality,
and balance . . . ." Edward Kruk, Practice Issues, Strategies, and Models: The
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For many people, there is no such thing as
neutrality or impartiality. If someone is not for them,
then they are against them. The very concept of
neutrality may be difficult, if not impossible, for some
to accept and the result is that conflict resolution
processes may seem unfair, slanted, pressuring, and
unsafe."14
The lack of synchronicity between what mediation
professionals advance as the hallmark of the mediator's role-
neutrality-and litigants' motivation in using the ADR method
suggests that mediation, at least as traditionally practiced, does not
meet the expectations of those utilizing the process to resolve
divorce disputes.
2. Absence of Legal Counsel During Mediation
Undermines Procedural and Substantive
Fairness
Parties are not always entitled to have counsel present during
mediation.' 15 The practice in many jurisdictions is for parties to
attend mediation outside the presence of counsel even when lawyers
are permitted to attend.1 6 Restrictions related to attorney attendance
at mediation vary by jurisdiction. Most statutes or rules fall into one
of three categories: they (1) are silent as to the attorneys' role during
mediation sessions; (2) permit counsel's attendance; or (3) imply that
Current State of the Art of Family Mediation, 36 FAM. & CONCLtATION CTS. REV.
195, 204 (1998).
114. MAYER, supra note 36, at 54.
115. Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyerless Dispute Resolution: Rethinking a
Paradigm, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 381, 392 (2010).
116. P. Oswin Chrisman et al., Collaborative Practice Mediation: Are We
Ready to Serve This Emerging Market?, 6 PEPP. DiSP. RESOL. L.J. 451, 454 (2006)
(stating that face-to-face mediations many times take place without attorneys
present).
270 [ Vol. 30:2
Winter 2011] WE CAN WORK IT OUT 271
presence is permitted." 7  At least nine states require attorney
attendance (if the parties are represented by counsel), unless excused
by court order or otherwise. 8 In contrast, a few states prohibit
117. The following states specifically permit, but do not require attorney
attendance: Alabama (in cases of domestic violence), ALA. CODE § 6-6-20(f)(3)
(LexisNexis 2005); Alaska (in cases of domestic violence), ALASKA STAT.
§ 25.20.080(g)(3) (2008); Delaware, DEL. FAM. CT. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(1) (2010);
Hawaii (in cases of domestic violence), HAW. REV. STAT. § 580-41.5(b)(3), (d)(3)
(2006); Illinois (in cases of child custody at case management conferences), ILL.
SUP. CT. R. 904; Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.7(4)(c) (West 2005); Nebraska,
NEB. SUP. CT. STANDARDS OF PRAC. AND ETHICS FOR FAM. MEDIATORS, Standard
VI (2008); New Hampshire, N.H. R. FAM. Div. 2.13(E) (2010); North Dakota,
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09.1-05 (2009); Oklahoma (while not specifically
mentioning attorneys, the rule indicates that those assisting the party, by acting on
the party's behalf or in support of the party, may attend), OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, ch.
37 app., R. 10(B) (West 2001); South Dakota (mediator may choose to exclude
attorneys), S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-59 (2004); Tennessee (in cases of
domestic violence), TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-4-131(d)(1)(C), 36-6-107(a)(3), 36-
6-305(3) (2005); and, Virginia, VA. CODE ANN § 8.01-576.5 (2007). The
following states imply that attorney attendance is permitted, by referencing
attorney presence in the statutes and/or rules: Florida, FLA. FAM. L. R. P.
12.740(d) (1995); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. § 9:4112(B)(1) (2008); and, North
Carolina, N.C. R. SUPER. CT. MEDIATED SETTLEMENT CONF. R. 6(A)(2). The
following states either make no mention of attorneys in their mediation statutes
and rules or explicitly prohibit the presence of attorneys: Arkansas, ARK. CODE
ANN. § 9-12-322 (2009); California, CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 1810-1820 (2004); CAL.
R. CT. 5.210; Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-305 (2009); Connecticut,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-53a (West 2009); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 19-5-
1 (2004); Maryland, MD. R. FAM. LAW § 9-205 (2010); Massachusetts, MASS.
PROB. & FAM. CT. STANDING ORDER 1-06 (2009); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 518.619 (West 2006); Missouri, Mo. SUP. CT. R. 88.01-09; Nevada, NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 3.475(2), 3.500(2) (2009); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-12-1 to
6 (LexisNexis 2006); New York, N.Y. CT. R. 137.12; Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3109.052 (LexisNexis 2008); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 107.765 (2009);
Pennsylvania, 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3901 (West 2001); Rhode Island, R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 15-5-29 (2003); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-39 (LexisNexis
2007); UTAH R. CT. ANNEXED A.D.R. 101; Vermont, VT. SUP. CT. ADMIN. ORDER
No. 42 (2007); and West Virginia, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-9-202 (LexisNexis
2009).
118. Indiana mandates attorney attendance, absent prior court order, IND.
CT. R. A.D.R. 2.7(B); in Kentucky, unless the parties agree otherwise, attorneys
must attend mediation, KY. CT. MODEL MEDIATION R. 8; Maine requires attorney
participation in the mediation process in all cases involving minor children, ME. R.
CIV. P. 11 OA(b); Michigan obligates the mediator to meet with the parties and
counsel, if any, MICH. CT. R. 2.411(C)(2); attorney attendance is mandatory,
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attorneys from accompanying their clients to mediation absent a
prior court order permitting attendance, or, in some cases, approval
of the mediator, agreement of the parties, or a specific request by the
mediator that counsel be present.
There has been much debate about whether counsel's
participation helps or hinders the mediation process.120 When parties
of unequal levels of education, financial means, and sophistication
participate in mediation, the absence of counsel may provide an
unfair advantage to the more savvy party,121 creating inherent
procedural unfairness. Because the role of the mediator is not to
educate or provide legal advice, one party's lack of sophistication
necessarily creates a negotiating imbalance which can lead to
manipulation by the more powerful party.122 The presence of
unless excused by court order in Mississippi, LOCAL UNIF. Civ. R. Miss. DIST. CT.
83.7(G)(2); New Jersey allows attorneys to accompany their clients but does not
mandate that they do so, N.J. CT. R. 1:40-4(g); South Carolina requires attorney
attendance unless the mediator and all parties agree to proceed without counsel, or
otherwise ordered by the court, S.C. CT. R. REG. A.D.R. I1(a); Arizona requires
attorney attendance unless the parties agree otherwise, ARIZ. R. FAM. L.P.
67(B)(5); Idaho requires the attorneys to attend, unless excused by the mediator,
IDAHO R. CIv. P. 16(k)(10); and, while not explicit, Texas implies that attorney
presence is required by indicating that the mediator should not convene a session
unless all parties and their "representatives" have appeared, (a later reference to
who can appear on behalf of a corporation suggests that "representative" was not
intended to mean a person representing a non-individual legal entity), TEX. SUP.
CT. ETHIcAL GUIDELINES FOR MEDIATORS § 7.
119. In Kansas, the mediator is only obligated to permit the parties to attend
and may exclude counsel, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-603(6) (2007); Some
Washington courts provide that only the parties will attend, unless the parties agree
counsel or other third parties may be present. See, e.g., LEWIS CNTY. SUPERIOR
CT. L.R. 8. In Wisconsin, the mediator is given discretion to include or exclude
counsel, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.405(10)(a) (2009); and in Montana the mediator
may also exclude counsel, MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-301(1) (2009).
120. See, e.g., Kovach, supra note 46, at 58-60 (discussing both lawyers'
control of the mediation process as well as the perceived need for party
participation).
121. See Sternlight, supra note 115, at 405-09 (describing, among other
things, lawyers' roles in "ferreting out" information in the marital dissolution
context).
122. See id. at 409 (stating that an impartial mediator cannot compensate for
the absence of representation).
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counsel to provide legal advice, including an explanation of rights
and obligations arising as a matter of law, and the practical and legal
implications if these are altered by an agreement, is essential to
ensuring that a party who settles at mediation does so with informed
consent, and not merely as a result of a bargaining disadvantage.123
The traditional mediation paradigm has been utilized in
divorce litigation with substantial success. Studies indicate that 61-
70% of family law cases settle, at least partially, during mediation,
and in many of those cases neither party is represented by counsel.124
Lack of lawyer participation during the process in many
jurisdictions, however, has lead to criticism of the effectiveness of
mediation as an ADR method.125
When the parties' attorneys do not participate in the
mediation, the mediator may be required to provide the parties with a
draft agreement so they may obtain attorney review prior to
executing it.126  Some statutory variations permit the parties to
execute the agreement when the mediation concludes, and then
provide the document to counsel, who must approve the agreement
within a stated period of time, after which it becomes binding upon
the parties.127 If either party's attorney objects to any portion of the
agreement, the entire agreement may be rescinded,1 28 often leaving
the parties with no alternative but to litigate. 129 Presence of the
parties' attorneys during mediation sessions allows the agreement to
be approved and executed by the parties at the conclusion of the
session. This effectively eliminates the period of "buyer's remorse"
that can follow execution of a mediated settlement agreement
123. See Murphy, supra note 40, at 907 (describing the increased risks of
mediation for the unrepresented).
124. See Flaccus, supra note 77, at 81 (discussing three studies that found
61-70% of parents who mediate reach a full or partial settlement).
125. See TESLER, supra note 80, at 9-10 (discussing the distinctions
between mediation and the collaborative law model).
126. See, e.g., FLA. FAM. L.R.P. 12.740(f)(1) (requiring mediator to mail any
agreement signed by parties not represented by counsel at mediation to counsel for
the parties within five days of execution, and allowing counsel not present at
mediation ten days to review and approve an agreement signed at mediation).
127. Id.
128. TESLER, supra note 80, at 11.
129. See Lande & Herman, supra note 49, at 282-83 (noting the trend of
"litigotiation" in which attorneys use the court process to strategically pursue
settlement).
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without assistance of counsel, and result in later rejection of such
agreements. 30
An attorney participating in the mediation can advise the
client of available options and the effects of exercising those options;
a mediator is likely constrained from providing that level of
information.131 Settling a case, whether at mediation or in any other
forum, without being advised of available alternatives and
ramifications of a decision to settle-or not settle-would be akin to
undergoing elective surgery without knowing the potential side
effects and what other non-surgical treatment is available; under
such circumstances most would agree that the surgery lacked the
patient's informed consent. Mediation agreements should, likewise,
be the product of informed consent.
Another benefit of attorney participation in mediation is the
potential for obtaining discovery needed by a party to make a
reasoned and informed decision prior to settlement. Because
mediation typically starts once an action has commenced, usually at
least some discovery has occurred. 132  Absent court order or
agreement by the parties, which usually must be approved by the
court, discovery is not stayed while the parties participate in
mediation, but continues to follow procedural deadlines.' One
reason that discovery continues is to eliminate any incentive to use
mediation to delay court proceedings. 134 Another is that many
judges face administratively-mandated timelines for completing
cases on their dockets,'35 reducing the control that both lawyers and
litigants have over the timing of the case.
From a strictly risk management perspective, attorneys are
required to undertake at least some discovery prior to settling a
130. See TESLER, supra note 80, at 11 (discussing the benefits of building
legal representation into the process of mediation).
131. See Murphy, supra note 40, at 906-07 (noting the benefits of
representation by counsel at mediation).
132. See, e.g., Suzanne J. Schmitz, A Critique of the Illinois Circuit Court
Rules Concerning Court-Ordered Mediation, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 783, 792-94
(2005) (explaining the effects of mediation on the discovery process).
133. Id. at 793-94.
134. Id. at 794.
135. For example, in Florida, the "presumptively reasonable" time period for
completing contested divorce actions at the trial level is 180 days from the date of
filing. FLA. R. JUD. ADMiN. 2.250(a)(1)(C).
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matter, absent explicit, written directions from their clients that
discovery is not to take place.' 36  It is difficult, if not virtually
impossible, for a lawyer to offer a professional opinion and fulfill
ethical requirements to advise a client of "the client's legal rights and
obligations and explain[] their practical implications," 3 unless the
attorney has an understanding of the client's specific situation. 138
Information derived solely from the client is often unreliable or
incomplete; consequently, discovery during litigation typically
provides the means for the attorney to develop a factual basis for the
legal advice provided, and allows the party to make an informed
decision about settlement. 139
In contrast, attorneys may hinder the success of mediation
through an unwillingness to retreat from litigation positions for fear
that eagerness to negotiate will be viewed as a sign of weakness.140
Concern about potential professional liability claims may also cause
attorneys to complete all discovery before engaging in mediation.141
Because traditional law school education focuses on litigation
training, the concept that an attorney's primary role should be
problem-solver-as opposed to litigator-has not necessarily taken
hold among the practicing bar.142
136. See MOSTEN, supra note 81, at 243-47 (discussing the need for
discovery to appropriately advise the client of rights and obligations); Schmitz,
supra note 132, at 793 (noting that the reason stated for non-settlement of one-
fourth of cases at mediation was insufficient discovery of relevant information).
137. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Preamble § 2 (2007).
138. Clients' knowledge of all legally relevant facts necessary to make an
accurate assessment of the legal viability of their claims is often limited.
Furthermore, depending upon the issues, expert opinions are often helpful in
providing needed technical information. In contrast, at some point attorneys must
acknowledge that their understanding of the factual underpinnings of the action is
sufficient to allow them to offer meaningful advice so that a client can make an
informed decision about settlement alternatives. See MOSTEN, supra note 81, at
243-47 (noting the importance of full disclosure between attorney and client).
139. Id. at 245-47.
140. Lande & Herman, supra note 49, at 280.
141. See generally Andrew S. Grossman, Avoiding Legal Malpractice in
Family Law Cases: The Dangers of not Engaging in Financial Discovery, 33 FAM.
L.Q. 361 (1999) (discussing attorneys' obligation to fully utilize discovery in even
simple proceedings).
142. In some states that offer a specialization or certification designation in a
particular area of law, eligibility requirements may center on the number of cases
actually tried to verdict, rather than settled. E.g., R. REG. FLA. BAR 6 (requiring
Winter 2011] 275
THE RE VIEW OF LITIGATION
In order for litigants to embrace an ADR process, the
paradigm used should focus on satisfying needs typically met
through litigation. Mediation often results in settlement of divorce
disputes; however, neutrality of the mediator and the common lack
of counsel participation in mediation challenge both procedural and
substantive justice. The proposed cooperative mediation process
addresses these shortcomings.
B. Collaborative Law'143 Fails as a Voluntary Dispute
Resolution Process Because it is Inherently Coercive
In 1990, Stuart Webb, a Minnesota attorney specializing in
marital and family law, developed a new ADR method known as
collaborative law, which has been embraced by many family
practitioners as a method for resolving divorce cases through a
process forsaking any resort to litigation.144 Disenchanted with the
escalating litigious and vindictive nature of matrimonial litigation,
Webb created a practice paradigm that has attempted to catapult the
shift in focus from rights-based to interest-based negotiations in
family litigation.145 The original concept developed by Webb has
evolved into variants dubbed "collaborative divorce" and
that attorneys applying for designation as a board certified lawyer in a practice
area of specialization must have participated in and tried to verdict, as sole or lead
counsel, a specified number of cases). The lack of certifications or designations
for attorneys that routinely and effectively resolve disputes without resorting to a
trial suggests that courtroom skills are more highly valued than skills employed in
conciliation, cooperation, negotiation, and non-litigation resolutions.
143. Although collaborative law has been used primarily in family law
cases, it has also been suggested as an ADR method for other areas of civil
litigation. See, e.g., Karen Fasler, Show Me the Money!! The Potential for Cost
Savings Associated with a Parallel Program and Collaborative Law, 20 HEALTH
LAW. 15, 15-16 (2007) (suggesting that collaborative law can be used in patient
safety programs designed to compensate for patient injuries).
144. Gary L. Voegele et al., Collaborative Law: A Useful Tool for the
Family Law Practitioner to Promote Better Outcomes, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REv.
971, 974 (2007).
145. SHEILA M. GuyERMAN, COLLABORATIVE LAW: A NEW MODEL FOR
DIsPuTE RESOLUTION 1-2 (2004).
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"collaborative practice."l 4 6  The dominant characteristics
distinguishing all methods deemed "collaborative" from any other
dispute resolution method are the requirements that litigation can
never be threatened or considered as a choice for resolving the
dispute, and failure to achieve a settlement results in disqualification
of counsel from further representation of either party. 14 7
Collaborative lawyers maintain that, similar to mediation, the
goal of the process is to achieve settlement.148 Many of the same
benefits attributed to mediation are also derived through
collaborative law, as they would be with any other ADR method
associated with removal of family law cases from judicial
determination. Avoiding a trial, with its attendant costs, both
financial and emotional, should be considered a good result
regardless of the methodology used. Unlike mediation, however,
which typically is used during the pendency of a court action,
collaborative law is generally used prior to an action being filed. 149
Rather than relying on an adversarial, rights-based approach
to representation, collaborative lawyers view their role as helping
clients, jointly, to achieve a settlement, and also to protect the
interests of non-client children.15 0  This has lead to criticism of
collaborative law, raising questions whether the collaborative lawyer
146. Voegele et al., supra note 144, at 977.
147. TESLER, supra note 80, at 6.
148. Collaborative law is akin to a facilitative mediation process. See
description of facilitative mediation supra note 96.
149. See GUTrERMAN, supra note 145 at 50 (discussing the commitment not
to resort to litigation made by parties to collaborative law resolutions). However,
Texas does provide for collaborative law to be initiated once a divorce action has
been filed. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 6.603, 153.0072 (West 2005).
150. TESLER, supra note 80, at 3-4. Collaborative law has been described as
a "participatory democratic endeavor" designed to include litigants in the process
of determining values, and tactics, strategies, and alternatives for furthering such
values. It has been viewed as a vehicle for social change through which
collaborative lawyers "strive to avoid, some would say to rebel against, the
standard professional model in which legal experts act on behalf of clients who set
broad parameters and express general assent, but are not otherwise central to the
actual resolution of their problems." Ascanio Piomelli, The Democratic Roots of
Collaborative Lawyering, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 541, 613 (2006).
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is vested in the process itself, as opposed to fulfilling the ethical
requirement of zealous representation of the client. 5 1
Collaborative law has its ardent supporters, but also has a
strong cache of detractors. The number of self-identified
"collaborative lawyers" remains relatively small,152 even though the
process has been in existence for two decades. Additionally, law
schools have been slow to offer courses in collaborative law as an
ADR method; most collaborative law practitioners select this
paradigm only after being exposed to it in their practices.153
The lack of extensive empirical studies measuring the
effectiveness of collaborative law and its short- and long-term
impact on participants and children of divorcel 54 necessarily means
that most claims of the efficacy of the process are anecdotal. For
151. See generally JULIE MACFARLANE, DEP'T OF JUSTICE-CANADA, THE
EMERGING PHENOMENON OF COLLABORATIVE FAMILY LAW (CFL): A
QUALITATIVE STUDY OF CFL CASES, 13 (2005), available at
http://www.justice.gc.caleng/pi/fcy-fea/lib-bib/rep-rap/2005/2005_1/pdfl2005_1.p
df (assessing whether collaborative family law allows clients and lawyers to
"escape the so-called 'prisoner's dilemma,' in which each side negotiates
reactively on the basis of their worst fears and assumptions about the other").
152. The International Academy of Collaborative Professionals, founded in
1999 (at that time it was called the American Institute of Collaborative
Professionals; the group changed its name in 2001), has less than 4,000 members
world-wide, including not only attorneys, but also financial professionals,
psychologists, and child specialists. History of lACP, INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY
OF COLLABORATIVE PROFESSIONALS, http://www.collaborativepractice.com/
t.asp?M=3&MS=3&T=History (last visited Sept. 17, 2010). Thirty-one hundred
of those members are from the United States and comprise 227 practice groups
around the country. Collaborative Practice Groups: USA, INTERNATIONAL
ACADEMY OF COLLABORATIVE PROFESSIONALS, http://www.
collaborativepractice.com/practiceGroupByCountry.asp?country=USA (last visited
Sept. 17, 2010).
153. William H. Schwab, Collaborative Lawyering: A Closer Look at an
Emerging Practice, 4 PEPP. DIsP. RESOL. L.J. 351, 372 (2004). It was not until
2003 that a small handful of law schools began to offer courses in collaborative
law. Lande, Possibilities for Collaborative Law, infra note 201, at 1327-28.
154. There appear to be only two studies of lawyers' and clients'
experiences with collaborative law. The Macfarlane report involved only sixteen
case studies and did not follow all cases to conclusion. MACFARLANE, supra note
151, at 15. The Schwab survey of 367 lawyers yielded only seventy-one responses
from collaborative law attorneys and twenty-five client responses; it consisted of
retrospective, self-reported data from lawyers for up to the prior eleven years.
Schwab, supra note 153, at 370-71, 374.
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example, one collaborative lawyer opined that benefits derived by
parties engaged in the process cannot be matched by any other ADR
method because "no dispute-resolution modality presently available
to divorcing families matches collaborative law in its ability to
manage and resolve conflict, elicit creative out-of-the-box solutions,
facilitate respectful communications and self-determined outcomes,
protect children, and support parties in realizing their highest
intentions for their lives after the legal process is over."15 5  This
measurement of success of collaborative law in promoting client
decisionmaking leading to empowerment and recognition of both
parties' needs is the same measurement of success some have
suggested for mediation.' 56 The proposition that an ADR process is
successful only when parties have been "transform[ed] . . . such that
they are better able to articulate their interests ('empowerment') and
acknowledge the interests of the other party ('recognition'),"'
5 7
regardless of whether a settlement has been reached, has been widely
criticized, however.15 8
Collaborative law, like mediation, does not meet the parties'
needs for an ADR method that provides the psychic benefits of
litigation, without the attendant emotional, financial, and
psychological trauma. The participation agreement executed by the
parties, and in many instances their attorneys, mandates attorney
disqualification if the case is not resolved, which can force
settlement terms that may not otherwise be considered acceptable by
the parties. 59 The significant investment of time and financial
resources into the process coerces parties into continuing with the
ADR method because the litigation alternative can become cost
prohibitive.160  The voluntary, complete disclosure required by
155. TESLER, supra note 80, at 5.
156. Keet, supra note 79, at 321-22.
157. Id. at 320.
158. See, e.g., id (shifting the focus of the transformation debate to a
community level); Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining with a Hugger: The Weaknesses
and Limitations of a Communitarian Conception of Legal Dispute Bargaining, or
Why We Can't All Just Get Along, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT REsOL. 1, 1-7 (2007)
(arguing that communitarian bargaining theory presumes an overly idealized
version of legal disputes and cannot serve as a guide to real-life bargaining in most
situations).
159. See discussion infra Parts III.B.1 & 3.
160. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
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collaborative law also raises concerns about breach of confidentiality
of attorney-client communications, and negatively impacts the
zealous advocate role attorneys are ethically bound to maintain.161
Collaborative law is not wholly without merit, however. Use of
jointly-retained experts and, in certain circumstances, the four-way
meetings are both useful ADR process features. These key aspects
of collaborative law practice warrant further examination.
1. The Collaborative Law Participation
Agreement Reduces the Voluntariness of
Settlements
Collaborative law has been described as a "process
consist[ing] of two lawyers and their respective clients who sign
binding agreements defining the scope and sole purpose of the
lawyers' representation: to help the parties engage in creative
problem solving aimed at reaching a negotiated agreement that meets
the legitimate needs of both parties."162  In order to encourage
settlement, parties and their counsel enter into a written agreement
providing that counsel for both parties, as well as any experts
participating in the process, are disqualified from further
representation of either party if the matter does not settle.163 The
disqualification provision not only requires the parties to retain new
counsel in the event settlement attempts fail, but also prohibits the
collaborative lawyer from participating in the subsequent
representation, other than for purposes of assisting in the transfer of
the case to trial counsel.164
Valuable factual knowledge gained by the collaborative
lawyer, as well as insights into the family dynamics developed over
an extended period of representation during the collaborative law
161. See discussion infra Part I1I.B.2.
162. TESLER, supra note 80, at 9.
163. Id. at 4. Although it has been suggested that this is similar to the
concept of "settlement counsel," engaged solely for negotiation purposes,
settlement counsel are not wholly excluded from further participation in the
representation if the matter does not settle. For a discussion of the uses of
settlement counsel, see generally James E. McGuire, Why Litigators Should Use
Settlement Counsel, 18 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 107 (2000).
164. TESLER, supra note 80, at 14.
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process, can be lost when settlement is not reached.165  Similarly,
experts retained to analyze financial information and offer valuation
opinions are excluded from the litigation process; their reports and
opinions cannot be used following an unsuccessful attempt at
collaborative dispute resolution.166  Although parties who execute
the participation agreement retain the right to withdraw from the
process and seek judicial intervention, the decision to do so comes at
a high price. Automatic disqualification of both attorneys is
generally mandated by the agreement if: (1) either party seeks to
withdraw from the collaborative law process; (2) either party is
acting in "bad faith" by threatening litigation; or (3) an attorney
suspects that the client may not be negotiating in good-faith because
the client fails to comply with interim agreements, is not
forthcoming with information, or undertakes unilateral actions. 16 7
Collaborative lawyers view the coercive effect of the
financial and emotional impact caused by mandatory disqualification
as the key element that encourages parties to engage in good faith
negotiations from an interest-based approach. 16 8 Proponents assert
that the disqualification requirement causes the risk of failure of the
process to be borne by the lawyers as well as the parties; in contrast,
they suggest that if mediation does not result in a settlement, the
parties' attorneys do not bear any risk because they continue
representing the client through the trial phase.' 69
The most significant attack on collaborative law is focused
on the mandatory disqualification agreement. 170  It has been
suggested that lawyer withdrawal from client representation before
165. See John Lande & Forrest S. Mosten, Collaborative Lawyers' Duties to
Screen the Appropriateness of Collaborative Law and Obtain Clients' Informed
Consent to Use Collaborative Law, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 347, 369, 381-
83 (2010) (discussing risks of attorney disqualification in the collaborative law
process).
166. See id at 369 (mentioning the possibility that parties will have to retain
new experts).
167. TESLER, supra note 80, at 130.
168. GUTTERMAN, supra note 145, at 49-53.
169. TESLER, supra note 80, at 10-12, 20 n.3.
170. MACFARLANE, supra note 151, at 39 (questioning whether the
disqualification agreement is crucial to the success of this ADR method, or if an
agreement to refrain from litigation for a specified time period could accomplish
the same goals, though collaborative lawyers maintain that the disqualification
agreement is key to keeping the parties engaged in the process).
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the matter has concluded amounts to a breach of ethical duties to the
client.' 7' After spending more than two years drafting a Uniform
Collaborative Law Act, the Uniform Law Commission withdrew its
resolution that the proposed act be approved by the ABA House of
Delegates at the February 2010 Mid-Year meeting because of
significant opposition, although the act had been unanimously
approved by the Commission and had received the endorsement of
the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution, which co-sponsored the
resolution.172 One member of the ABA House of Delegates reported
uncharacteristically heated debate on the Delegates' listserv prior to
the meeting, which continued during member caucuses. 73
Opponents of the act, including four of the ABA sections, raised
three arguments: (1) the mandatory disqualification provision is
unprofessional because it allows litigants to "game the system" and
cause the opposing counsel's disqualification at a critical moment
during the negotiations; (2) a client's ability to give true informed
consent to engage in collaborative law is questionable; and (3) the
act immerses the legislature too deeply into the practice of law,
undermining judicial authority.' 74  Proponents countered that the
ABA Ethics Commission and all states that had considered the issue
(with the exception of Colorado) had found the practice did not
violate any ethical requirements.' 7 5  Collaborative law advocates
acknowledged that the process may not be appropriate for all, but
argued that, as a practical matter, some lawyers were engaged in the
practice and it would be beneficial to have uniform guidelines.' 76
171. See generally Larry R. Spain, Collaborative Law: A Critical Reflection
on Whether a Collaborative Orientation Can be Ethically Incorporated into the
Practice of Law, 56 BAYLOR L. REv. 141, 162-65 (2004) (stating that a strict
interpretation of Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.16 may make a withdrawal
clause unethical); Matthew M. Wolf, Who's My Client Again?, 36 COLO. LAW. 97,
98 (2007) (arguing that the "traditional Collaborative Law model does not fit
within [the] existing ethical construct").
172. Section of Dispute Resolution: Collaborative Law Committee,
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, www.abanet.org/dch/committee.cfin?com
=DR035000 (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
173. Richard T. Cassidy, ABA Delegate's Report, VT. B.J., Spring 2010, at 1,
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Proponents of collaborative lawyering maintain that the
disqualification agreement provides a form of permitted unbundled
legal services. Limited representation of a client is possible, 7 8
and, perhaps, an agreement restricting a lawyer's role to settlement
counsel would not violate ethical restrictions; the disqualification
agreement required in collaborative law cases goes well beyond
merely such limitations, however.179
An ethical conflict is created because the agreement
effectively allows the opposing party to determine if the other party's
counsel continues in the representation.' 8 0  Because the
disqualification agreement requires automatic withdrawal if an
impasse is reached or one party declines to continue with the
process, each party has the unprecedented power to dismiss their
opposition's attorney without cause. Rather than entering into a
177. See generally Forrest S. Mosten, Unbundling Legal Services and the
Family Lawyer, 28 FAM. L.Q. 421 (1994) (advocating for the use of unbundled
legal services in the family law arena).
178. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2007) ("A lawyer may
limit the scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the
circumstances and the client gives informed consent."); see also Peppet, supra
note 46, at 489-90 (discussing the possibility that "mandatory mutual withdrawal"
cannot be reconciled with the Model Rules because the significant cost in retaining
new counsel runs counter to a client's interest, prohibiting an attorney from
limiting services in this manner).
179. Scholars have questioned whether a client can give prospective consent
permitting an attorney's withdrawal, especially when that withdrawal is
detrimental to the client's financial interest and may be caused by the opposing
party's unilateral actions. Spain, supra note 171, at 163-65.
180. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a), (a)(2) (2007) ("[A]
lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent
conflict of interest" which exists if "there is a significant risk that the
representation . . . will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to ...
a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer."). A lawyer must consider
potential conflicts of interest before representation commences. Here, there are
two areas of potential conflict: first, under the disqualification agreement the
lawyer has an obligation to a third party-the opposing party-to cease
representing a client if the opposing party so demands; and second, the lawyer is
beholden to the collaborative law process and has an interest in ensuring the
process is followed. See Lande, infra note 201, at 1356 (discussing reasons that
the "prospect of one party forcing the discharge of the other party's lawyer seems
quite problematic").
181. See Christopher M. Fairman, A Proposed Model Rule for Collaborative
Law, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 73, 116-21 (2005) (discussing the suggestion
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contract for representation with the client being represented, the
collaborative lawyer also effectively enters into a contract with the
opposing party, permitting such party to discharge the attorney. 182
The prevalent view among collaborative lawyers that their
focus is on safeguarding the process has been criticized as diverting
the lawyer's attention from the duty of zealous representation of the
client and placing the burden on the client to secure the best result
possible.' 8  If disqualification results, the client, who may have
complied with all directions from counsel and been an otherwise
model client, acting in good faith throughout the collaborative law
that a new model rule should be adopted to resolve the ethical issues raised by the
collaborative law process).
182. See Wolf, supra note 171, at 98 (discussing the Colorado Bar
Association Ethics Committee's disapproval of collaborative law based on this
conflict in Opinion 115). The Committee found that the disqualification provision
was impermissible because a client was unable to knowingly waive the conflict of
interest created by the lawyer's obligation to the opposing party; the potential for
conflict was significant and such conflict would prevent the attorney from
considering litigation as a method for resolving the dispute. Id. The only way to
avoid the non-waivable conflict and still use the collaborative law process in
Colorado would be for the parties to execute the disqualification agreement
without joinder of their attorneys. Id. In contrast, Kentucky, Maryland,
Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, and
Washington have issued ethics opinions permitting the use of the collaborative law
process, although several opinions issued detailed warnings about when and how
the practice should be used. See e.g., Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics &
Prof 1 Responsibility, Informal Op. 2004-24 (2004), 2004 WL 2758094 at *3
(requiring lawyers maintain their role as client advocates, even during the
collaborative law process). Similarly, the ABA also issued an opinion in 2007
indicating that no ethical conflicts were presented by the process. ABA Comm.
On Ethics & Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 447 (2007). One commentator
suggested that the disagreement over whether collaborative law complies with
lawyers' ethical obligations to clients is a result of variances in agreements that
create three different sets of characteristics for the practice in different locations.
Scott R. Peppet, The (New) Ethics of Collaborative Law, DISP. RESOL. MAG.,
Winter 2008, at 23, 23, 25-26.
183. See MACFARLANE, supra note 151, at 59 (identifying a risk when the
lawyer's commitment to the process "appears to outweigh his or her commitment
to the client"). This commitment to the process, rather than the outcome, becomes
more problematic when the parties do not have equal bargaining power and one
may feel pressured into a settlement by the other. Id.
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process, must educate new counsel about the case and bear
additional financial costs that result, not to mention suffer further
delay in having the marriage dissolved. Attorney withdrawal under
these conditions raises serious ethical questions because the client
faces significant adverse consequences.
Another by-product of the disqualification agreement is that,
even when negotiations have stalled, parties may feel unable to
withdraw from the process because of financial consequences.' 8 5
Many couples reach a tipping point beyond which withdrawal
becomes impossible because the cost of retaining new counsel is
beyond the parties' financial means. 186 It does not appear that clients
share the collaborative lawyers' belief that the disqualification
agreement is essential to the success of the process culminating in a
settlement. In a survey of clients engaged in collaborative law cases,
less than half believed the disqualification agreement kept them
negotiating rather than withdrawing from the process; in contrast,
more than three-quarters of attorneys indicated that the
disqualification agreement prevented clients from resorting to
litigation.
Although collaborative law proponents claim the process
gives parties more control, scholars suggest the disqualification
agreement causes the opposite result. Clients can be left with the
impression that procedural fairness is lacking because their lawyers
are not assuming the anticipated role of advocates advancing the
clients' legal rights. Instead, settlement without regard to each
party's legal entitlements is the primary focus, causing frustration for
clients who may feel a loss of control during the four-way meetings
when their positions are not being supported.18 8  One study
suggested that collaborative lawyers may be inclined to impose their
system of values on clients and do not adequately disclose why they
prefer collaborative law to traditional adversarial-based conflict
184. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(1) (2007) (permitting an
attorney to withdraw only if "withdrawal can be accomplished without material
adverse effect on the interests of the client").
185. Lande, infra note 201, at 1356.
186. MACFARLANE, supra note 151, at 39, 62, 78.
187. Lande, infra note 201, at 1324 n.22.
188. Id. at 1371.
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resolution models.' 89 For those parties who feel compelled to stay in
the process because of financial constraints, the disqualification
agreement may result in a withdrawal from interest-based
negotiations because there is pressure to accept any settlement in lieu
of the alternative-litigation with increased costs to retain new
counsel.190 Consequently, the disqualification agreement in many
ways inhibits procedural fairness and fails to address the client's
needs for vindication, validation, and safety, which would be
available through litigation.'91
2. Collaborative Lawyers' Focus on the Process
Paradigm Ignores Clients' Statutory Rights
and Obligations
In a successful collaborative law divorce, the goal of the
process-settlement-is achieved through a series of four-way
meetings during which the parties and their respective counsel
negotiate a resolution.192 Unlike traditional, lawyer-based
negotiations, there are no offers or counteroffers of settlement made
through counsel outside the presence of the parties.' 93 The parties,
as well as their lawyers, are expected to actively participate in
devising creative solutions.' 94  Unlike mediation, which typically
resolves even the most complex cases over one or two sessions, the
collaborative law model envisions that some cases can be resolved in
two to four four-way meetings; more complex cases may take seven
or more meetings.195 Four-way meetings may be coupled with
189. See MACFARLANE, supra note 151, at ix, 46-47 (discussing
collaborative lawyers who view their responsibility as to the whole family, not
specifically to their clients, and the need for collaborative lawyers to explain their
values regarding collaboration to the client).
190. Lande & Herman, supra note 49, at 283.
191. See supra text accompanying note 44 (identifying needs that are not
met by consensus-building processes).
192. See GuTrERmAN, supra note 145, at 41-47 (describing the four-way
meeting process).
193. See TESLER, supra note 80, at 11-12 (suggesting that in the
collaborative model the lawyers' work is more open and transparent to one another
and to both parties than in conventional legal negotiations).
194. Id. at 9.
195. Id. at 65. The information supporting such estimates is anecdotal.
Tesler estimates that a "simple" divorce can be resolved in as few as ten hours of
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individual meetings between counsel and the respective clients and
between counsel themselves. Not all collaborative lawyers agree,
however, whether individual meetings should occur and whether
they cloud the transparency collaborative law is intended to bring to
the divorce process.196 Collaborative law is a more costly process
than mediation due to the greater number of meetings required. 197
Because collaborative law is extrajudicial, there is no
formalized mechanism for issuing discovery requests. Instead,
parties are expected to provide "voluntary, early, and ongoing"
disclosure of all information relevant to the parties' divorce.19 This
would presumably include all financial information impacting asset
distribution and support issues, as well as information relevant to co-
parenting and time-sharing. When parties do not have necessary
information, they should execute voluntary authorizations requesting
third parties to produce documents without requiring a subpoena.' 9
lawyer time for each party, while more complex cases will involve "a minimum of
30 and probably significantly more hours of lawyer time for each party ... ." Id.
at 18. Macfarlane's study indicated that some clients were disappointed because it
took much longer to complete the process than initially represented by the
attorneys. MACFARLANE, supra note 151, at.23, 61-62.
196. Compare TESLER, supra note 80, at 59-63 (suggesting that prior to the
first four-way meeting and after each subsequent meeting counsel need to meet to
plan the agenda for the four-way meeting, review what occurred at the prior
meeting, and discuss issues (client conduct, emotional state, etc.) that may pose an
impediment to settlement; subsequent to each four-way meeting each lawyer also
has a private debriefing with the respective client), with MACFARLANE, supra note
151, at 29-63, 69 (noting that some practitioners subscribed to a collaborative law
model that did not include any one-on-one meetings between the client and
individual counsel once the process commenced; instead, all discussions took
place only during four-way meetings).
197. Kane, supra note 78. A survey of Boston Law Cooperative attorneys
found that the average cost for collaborative law cases was $19,723, while
mediated cases cost an average of $6,600. Id.
198. TESLER, supra note 80, at 10. The issuance of interrogatories, requests
for production of documents, etc. can still occur informally within the
collaborative law process, but there are no means for enforcing compliance
because resort to the courts is prohibited. Id. at 209-10. Furthermore, deposing
parties during the process is viewed as contrary to the presumption of good faith
participation. Id.
199. Id. at 210. Tesler also suggests that while parties should not be
deposed, issuing subpoenas to third parties to obtain information would be
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In theory, it appears that this requirement would foster a more
cooperative atmosphere for resolution of divorce disputes. As
practiced, however, a client's rights can be adversely impacted.
Collaborative lawyers stress that clients must be made aware
of the full disclosure requirement prior to agreeing to participate in
the process because the lawyer is bound to disclose all information
provided by the client that the lawyer deems relevant, unless the
client prohibits disclosure, in which case the lawyer may be required
to withdraw from representation. 200 The mandatory full disclosure
requirement can place the lawyer in the difficult position of being
required to breach the attorney-client privilege and disclose
information that a client could reasonably expect would be kept
confidential. 20 1  This feature of collaborative law makes it an
inappropriate choice in many, if not most, cases in which a client
- 202wishes to maintain privileged communications with counsel.
acceptable. Id. Presumably this could occur only in cases where the divorce
action has already been commenced.
200. Id. at 136. Additionally, refusing to permit counsel to disclose adverse
information is considered acting in bad faith under the collaborative law process.
GUTTERMAN, supra note 145, at 65.
201. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2009) ("A lawyer
shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the
client gives informed consent . . . ."). Critics have questioned whether
collaborative law clients can give informed consent and understand that any
information revealed to the lawyer that the lawyer then deems relevant is required
to be disclosed to the opposing party and lawyer. See, e.g., John Lande,
Possibilities for Collaborative Law: Ethics and Practice of Lawyer
Disqualification and Process Control in a New Model of Lawyering, 64 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1315, 1336-42 (2003) (noting that some collaborative law practitioners are
committed to transparency in a way that may be inconsistent with a client's
expectation of zealous advocacy); Spain, supra note 171, at 168-70 (discussing the
risk of disclosing information that may be used against the client in the future).
202. For example, in North Carolina, where adultery prohibits awards of
spousal support, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-l(a)(2) (2009), an attorney whose client
admits to having an extra-marital affair may be required to disclose that
information. N.C. St. Bar, Formal Ethics Op. 1 (2002), available at
http://www.ncbar.gov/ethics/ethics.asp?page=2&keywords=Collaborative (stating
that the client must be advised of the benefits and risks of disclosure requirements
in the collaborative law process before representation commences). Such a breach
of client confidences flies in the face of all ethical duties imposed on attorneys.
288 [ Vol. 30: 2
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Because state legislatures have established divorce as an adversarial
process, lawyers must still be mindful of the legal ramifications of
settlement discussions occurring during the collaborative process, so
that if a settlement is not reached, the clients' interests have not been
irreparably damaged by the process of open disclosure and wholesale
sharing of information. Lack of protected attorney-client
communications makes collaborative law difficult in most cases
where trust is already lacking between the parties.
The collaborative lawyer's mindset is that "[t]he lawyer is the
guardian of the process," and "the client is the guardian of the
substance."203 The lawyer remains detached from the typical lawyer
role of "solving the problem" that involves encouraging the client to
accept a settlement the lawyer deems is the best possible outcome for
the client.204 Instead, the lawyer keeps the client focused on
"identifyin , evaluating, and selecting the best of the available
options."20 In fulfilling this goal, each lawyer is responsible for
ensuring that "all feasible options have been developed accurately
and considered carefully and reasonably."20 6 Collaborative lawyers
maintain that the ultimate goal of the process is to secure a "good
enough agreement," basically defined as one that both parties are
willing to accept.207 The lack of consideration of statutory rights and
obligations in collaborative law may negatively impact clients' rights
to procedural and substantive justice. Without knowledge of
potential judicial outcomes, as in mediation, parties may enter into
agreements lacking informed consent.
Collaborative law proponents view mediation as an
unacceptable alternative to collaborative lawyering because the lack
of representation during the mediation process is problematic.2 08
203. TESLER, supra note 80, at 137.
204. Id. at 70.
205. Id. at 71.
206. Id. The collaborative lawyer is to refrain from encouraging any
specific outcome; instead, the client should be told, "I support whatever choice you
believe will bring you closest to the best possible outcome for yourself and those
you care about and I am available to help you implement your choice." Id. Placing
the onus on the client for developing and selecting the outcome deflects any
criticism from the client about settlement options that the attorney would otherwise
proffer. Id. at 70.
207. Id. at 15-17.
208. Id. at 10.
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Collaborative lawyers maintain that mediation outside the presence
of attorneys
work[s] effectively only for a relatively small group
of 'high-functioning, low-conflict' spouses. For more
challenged couples . . . a mediator alone cannot
eliminate the inevitable power imbalance between the
parties, while collaborative law, with its built-in
advocacy and legal counsel in service of consensual
resolution, can be appropriate for a much broader
spectrum of divorcing couples.20 9
At least one study indicated that parties chose collaborative
law over mediation because of the involvement of counsel,
particularly clients who felt vulnerable in engaging in negotiations
without such assistance.210
Proponents further claim that collaborative lawyers are more
satisfied with their work than lawyers operating under the traditional
adversarial approach taught in law school. 2 11 This satisfaction is
purportedly derived from the lawyer's ability to "integrat[e] one's
deeply held personal values into one's work . . . improv[ing] one's
effectiveness in collaborative law." 212  Attorneys involved in the
209. Id. at 7 n.11.
210. MACFARLANE, supra note 151, at xiii. It was not clear, however, if the
differences between collaborative law and mediation were explained to clients or
whether they were offered mediation as an alternative. Id.
211. TESLER, supra note 80, at 4. Tesler posits that collaborative lawyers
find satisfaction in the belief that helping clients craft their own settlements
"strengthen[s] the positive residual ties that survive the divorce, whether in co-
parenting the children of the marriage, or in maintaining long-standing
relationships with the extended family of the other party." Id. at 19. Again, the
lack of any significant empirical studies testing the long-term impact of
agreements reached through collaborative law means such pronouncements are
speculative, at best, and not entirely consistent with the Macfarlane study.
212. Id. at 5. Tesler suggests that "[g]ood collaborative lawyers recognize
that they are, at last, members of a helping and healing profession." Id.
Macfarlane found in her study that practitioners attracted to collaborative law were
generally dissatisfied with litigation as the method for resolving family disputes
and experienced high stress levels in practicing family law under the traditional
adversarial model. MACFARLANE, supra note 151, at 5-6, 17-19. In the Schwab
empirical study supported by the International Academy of Collaborative
Professionals that examined who participates in collaborative law, survey packets
290 [Vol. 30:2
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process also claim stress associated with litigation and court
appearances is eliminated; responsibility for the case is shared by
both attorneys and their clients, rather than just by each attorney
individually; and the lawyer's calendar can be more easily managed
without relying on the unpredictability associated with litigation.213
According to collaborative lawyers, benefits derived by clients
include a reduction in anxiety, a shift in focus from achieving the
most lucrative result in the divorce to behaving in a civilized way,
and an assumption of responsibility for how the divorce proceeds.214
This view of client satisfaction, however, may not be consistent with
the clients' perspectives.215
When and whether experts are retained varies among
collaborative law practitioners and practice norms established by
local collaborative law groups. Some practice groups suggest that a
team of experts, including appraisers, accountants, and divorce
coaches, should be retained when the process commences to assist
the parties and lawyers as issues related to their field of expertise
arise; 2 16 others maintain that experts should be retained only on an
as-needed basis and their participation should then be jointly
controlled and defined by the lawyers.217 Although the
were forwarded to 367 collaborative law attorneys from collaborative law practice
groups in seven states. Responses indicated that the collaborative lawyers who
responded (about 20%) ranged in age from 31 to 65, with an average of 60; the
average number of years in practice was 20, with a range from 4.5 to 41 years.
Schwab, supra note 153, at 370-72. This information supports the observations
that collaborative law appeals to experienced lawyers dissatisfied with the
litigation process as a resolution method for family disputes.
213. Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Law: A New Paradigm for Divorce
Lawyers, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 967, 989-91 (1999). Macfarlane noted in
her study that when discussing the benefits of collaborative law, the lawyers
practicing collaborative law often focused on the benefits they derived, as opposed
to those that the clients might receive. MACFARLANE, supra note 151, at 17-19.
214. Tesler, supra note 213, at 992.
215. See discussion infra Part III.B.3 (discussing client dissatisfaction with
the costs and delays of the collaborative law process).
216. TESLER, supra note 80, at 111-14.
217. Some collaborative lawyers actively market the "team approach" to
divorce resolution and offer their services to clients as a package deal including a
divorce coach, psychologist, forensic accountant, and other potential experts.
GUTTERMAN, supra note 145, at 89-91.
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recommended timing for retention of experts differs, one constant in
collaborative law is that, like the attorneys, any experts used are also
disqualified if a settlement is not reached.218 In addition, all reports
and work papers generated and opinions formed by the experts may
be inadmissible in any subsequent litigation between the parties. 2 19
Reports generated by experts in the collaborative law process may
tend to be more informal than those used in litigation, and,
consequently less costly,220 but the method for reaching an expert
opinion remains the same, and such efforts may be duplicated if the
collaborative process fails and the expert's reports are inadmissible
during the litigation.221
Although collaborative lawyers reject litigation as a method
to resolve any disputes, they do accept mediation as a possible
solution. In the event of an impasse, prior to automatic
disqualification, collaborative lawyers often resort to mediators or
private judges to address issues that simply cannot be resolved, in an
222effort to restart stalled negotiations.
3. Collaborative Law may not Result in
Increased Client Satisfaction
In a study of sixteen collaborative law cases, the lawyers
involved considered the results achieved when the cases settled
comparable to anticipated outcomes that would have been reached
through traditional litigation-negotiation processes.223 For cases in
218. TESLER, supra note 80, at 112.
219. See id. at 107 (indicating that an expert's report can be more informal
in collaborative law because the expert will not be deposed or testify at trial); see
also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-77 (2009) (providing that an expert's work-product
generated during the collaborative law process is inadmissible in court absent
agreement of the parties).
220. TESLER, supra note 80, at 114.
221. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-77 (2009) (excluding reports of experts
used in collaborative law, unless the parties agree otherwise).
222. TESLER, supra note 80, at 17. In an informal poll of collaborative
lawyers in Texas, all respondents indicated that they would urge clients to engage
in mediation rather than withdraw from the collaborative law process if
negotiations stalled, so long as the mediators used an interest-based approach,
rather than a risk-analysis approach. Chrisman et al., supra note 116, at 459-61.
223. MACFARLANE, supra note 151, at 57. Of the sixteen cases studied by
Macfarlane, eleven (69%) settled during the course of the three-year study: one
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which financial support was in dispute and in jurisdictions with
statutory guidelines, variances became less likely; results on issues
such as parental relocation and custody were less capable of being
compared because outcomes using different resolution dispute
mechanisms were more difficult to predict.2 24  Most lawyers
involved, however, maintained that although the results achieved
were comparable, the manner in which they were achieved and the
parties' satisfaction with the process was more positive. 22 Clients
did not necessarily support this view.226
The study further indicated that most clients who engaged in
collaborative law sought an inexpensive and quick resolution of the
marital dispute. 227 If the process did not result in a settlement, delays
and costs associated with retaining and educating new counsel ran
counter to this goal. Even when the collaborative law process
resulted in a settlement, clients found that promises of speed and
cost-savings were not always realized.228 Other clients not involved
couple reconciled; one left the collaborative law process shortly after it
commenced; and three cases were not settled at the time the case study concluded,
despite the fact that those cases had been using the collaborative law process for
between 12-15 months. Id. In addition, one of the cases that had settled
commenced litigation seeking modification of the agreement "almost
immediately." Id. at 15. Schwab's 2004 retrospective survey of collaborative law
practitioners indicated that 87.4% of cases over an eleven year period settled (654
out of 748). Schwab, supra note 153, at 374-75.
224. MACFARLANE, supra note 151, at 57.
225. See id at 58-59 (discussing the benefits specific clients achieved in
collaborative litigation). Lawyers involved in the study suggested that the process
resulted in the parties experiencing an increased ability to communicate and view
different perspectives of "fairness," which they anticipated would enhance the
parties' future relationship. Id.
226. Id. at 60.
227. Id. at 22-23. These expectations are developed as a result of the claims
made by collaborative law practitioners. Id.
228. Id. at ix. Although collaborative law proponents claim that
collaborative law cases typically settle in one to seven months, clients who have
participated in the process indicated that settlements in their cases took from 1.5 to
16 months to achieve, averaging 6.3 months. Schwab, supra note 153, at 376-77.
In Texas, after the divorce action is filed, parties are allowed up to two years
without court intervention to engage in the collaborative law process. TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 6.603(g), 153.0072(g) (West 2008); Spain, supra note 171, at 151
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in the study have also expressed dissatisfaction with their
experiences using collaborative law. 229
Another source of client dissatisfaction is that the focus on
the process itself can cause delays in resolution because, without the
deadline pressures imposed during litigation, the collaborative law
"process proceeds 'at the speed of the slowest participant."'
230
Rarely are both parties at the same emotional level when the divorce
process commences; consequently, the party who is not prepared to
let the marriage go can enjoy a veto power during the collaborative
law process by stalling negotiations through inertia. 231
Additional objections to collaborative law focus more on the
limited audience to which it appeals.232 Collaborative law advocates
acknowledge that careful screening is needed to select only clients
who have the potential to be successful in collaborating. 233
According to practitioners, spouses who do best are those who share
mutual trust and respect, a commitment to co-parenting, and a
willingness to assume responsibility for their problems. 234 in
(suggesting that procedural efficiency, not speed, was a primary motivation in the
Texas legislature's adoption of collaborative law statutes).
229. At least one disgruntled former spouse who participated in the
collaborative law process has posted comments on the Internet expressing his
dissatisfaction with the methods used and has invited others to comment on their
experiences. Mission, MY COLLABORATIVE LAW DIVORCE.ORG,
http://www.mycollaborativelawdivorce.org/front.htm#Mission (last visited Oct.
19, 2010).
230. MACFARLANE, supra note 151, at 61.
231. Id.
232. See Schwab, supra note 153, at 373 (indicating that collaborative law
clients were typically white, middle-aged (average age forty-nine, with an age
range of thirty-four to sixty-nine), well educated (84% had at least a four-year
college degree and 32% held advanced degrees), and affluent (84% had combined
family incomes in excess of $100,000 and 40% had incomes above $200,000)).
This information suggests that the process primarily appeals to those who have
significant assets, while those with more modest means would be unable to take
advantage of the alleged benefits of collaborative law.
233. TESLER, supra note 80, at 97-100.
234. Id. at 99. It is likely, however, that these same parties would
effectively and efficiently resolve their disputes regardless of what ADR process is
used, a fact that collaborative law experts acknowledge. See id ("Couples who
come to collaborative lawyers with a commitment to avoid litigation, and who
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contrast, poor candidates include those in the early stages of grieving
the loss of the marriage, those who are highly emotional, victims and
perpetrators of domestic violence, and those with psychiatric and
character disorders. 235 This necessarily limits the pool of divorcing
spouses suitable for the process.
C. A Comparison ofMediation and Collaborative Law
Highlights Key Process Similarities and Differences
The chart below offers a side-by-side comparison of major
features of the two ADR processes.
COLLABORATIVE LAW v. MEDIATION
PROCESS FEATURE COLLABORATIVE MEDIATIONLAW
Contract Required Prior to Yes Usually No
Commencing Process
Mediator/Facilitator Present Usually No Yes
Attorneys Present Yes Maybe
Four-Way Meetings Yes Maybe
Conducted Pre-Filing Usually Yes Usually No
Jointly-Retained Experts Yes Maybe
Voluntary, Complete' Yes No
Continuing Disclosure Required
Formal Discovery Undertaken No Maybe
Methods Available for N e
Compelling Discovery
Interlocutory Hearings Possible No Yes
Confidential Process Yes Yes
Can Privately Consult with Usually Yes Yes
Attorney
Attorney Disqualified in Event Yes No
of Impasse
Experts Disqualified in Event of Yes No
Impasse
Attorney and Expert Work No Ye
Product can be Used at Trial N
express genuine respect for and trust in one another . . . tend to do well however
they decide to handle their divorce.").
235. Id. at 99-100.
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The commonality of benefits derived from each process
cannot be disputed. Both ADR methods allow a greater ability to
fashion settlements tailored to particular family needs, offer greater
privacy than publically-accessible courtroom trials, and benefit from
reportedly greater rates of compliance typically achieved when
obligations are assumed through settlements, as opposed to those
imposed by judicial decrees.236
Collaborative law is more stringent in its requirements than
mediation, with few deviations in the process itself 23 7  This
formality of process is in keeping with the collaborative lawyers'
perspective that the lawyers protect the process from devolving
towards an adversarial approach.238 Indeed, collaborative law is
characterized by a series of prohibitions-resort to the courts is
prohibited, formal discovery is generally unavailable, lawyers cannot
continue in their representation, and expert work product is excluded
from future use.239 In contrast, there are wide permutations in how
mediation is practiced. The only real prohibition that arises in
mediation, which is likewise present in collaborative law, is that
236. Uniform Collaborative Law Act, Prefatory Note and Comments, 38
HOFSTRA L. REV. 421, 436 (2009); see generally supra note 77-79 and
accompanying text (stating that according to proponents of mediation in divorce
actions, there is an increase in the likelihood of compliance).
237. Despite assertions by collaborative lawyers that the process is more
flexible than mediation or other ADR methods, the proposed Uniform
Collaborative Law Act and texts describing the process establish procedures
deemed necessary. See generally GUTTERMAN, supra note 145. Furthermore, at
least one critic has commented upon the facially inconsistent argument made by
proponents that collaborative law encourages exploring creative resolutions to
legal problems yet totally eliminates litigation as a dispute resolution mechanism.
Susan B. Apel, Collaborative Law: A Skeptic's View, 30 VT. B.J., SPRING 2004, at
41, 41. Even scholars who attack the usefulness of the adversarial model as a
dispute resolution mechanism concede that parties should have the option of
selecting litigation, as a last resort. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the
Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV.
5, 32-33(1996).
238. See supra note 213 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits
derived from a collaborative law process versus a more adversarial process).
239. PAULINE H. TESLER, COLLABORATIVE LAW: ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE
RESOLUTION IN DIVORCE WITHOUT LITIGATION 10 (2d ed. 2008).
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matters discussed during the process remain confidential. 240 This
variation in process elements allows for maximum flexibility, but
may make mediation impractical for achieving potential results
241because of shortcomings identified above.
IV. A PROPOSED BLENDED PARADIGM: COOPERATIVE MEDIATION
ENCOURAGES SETTLEMENT BY FOSTERING PROCEDURAL AND
SUBSTANTIVE FAIRNESS
Neither mediation nor collaborative law, separately, provide
as effective a method for resolving disputes as can be achieved
through cooperative mediation.242 The cooperative mediation
240. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text (discussing the
confidentiality requirement for mediation).
241. See discussion supra Part III.A. (identifying several shortcomings of
mediation in divorce disputes, such as the possibility of resulting agreements
lacking informed consent).
242. An offshoot of collaborative law, referred to as "cooperative law,"
"cooperative divorce," or "cooperative negotiations" has gained support. See
Lande, supra note 201, at 1375 (suggesting that local collaborative groups should
also advise clients about the option of cooperative law). Cooperative law utilizes
the same features of collaborative law with one notable exception: the parties and
counsel do not enter into a disqualification agreement, thus eliminating the ethical
concerns raised by the collaborative law process. John Lande, A Recent
Innovation, "Cooperative" Negotiation Can Promote Early and Efficient
Settlement through Joint Case Management, 27 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST
LITIG. 117, 118 (2009). A recent study of cooperative lawyers in Wisconsin, imany
of whom also practiced collaborative law, found that the majority viewed
collaborative law negatively: (1) collaborative law "often is too cumbersome and
time-consuming"; (2) "there is often an expectation to use more four-way meetings
than needed"; and (3) there is "an expectation to use more professionals than
needed." John Lande, Practical Insights from an Empirical Study of Cooperative
Lawyers in Wisconsin, 2008 J. DiSP. RESOL. 203, 223 (2008) [hereinafter Lande,
Practical Insights]. The majority agreed that a cooperative approach was superior
because collaborative law generally took longer and cost more than cooperative
law. Id. at 223-24. Less than half of cooperative lawyers surveyed included a
provision in their agreements that required mediation before the parties proceeded
with litigation, although cooperative lawyers utilized a mediator in 50-62% of
cases when a serious impasse was reached. Id. at 230, 239. The cooperative
mediation paradigm proposed here differs from the cooperative law process
because it relies on a third-party facilitator as one of the primary participants;
cooperative lawyers tend to follow the collaborative law model of lawyer-centric
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paradigm focuses on resolving divorce disputes, while also
attempting to fulfill, at least partially, five of the six needs parties
often perceive are only met through litigation-voice, procedural
justice, vindication, validation, and safety.243
Many of the features of mediation are included in the
cooperative mediation model because they help to create a sense of
procedural justice among the participants and encourage effective
private ordering. Despite ethical and coercion concerns about
collaborative law, some elements of the process are consistent with
good lawyering and serve to diminish the negative impact of
litigation. These elements can be effectively incorporated into the
cooperative mediation paradigm without running afoul of ethics
rules.
Under this proposed blended paradigm, after a case has been
filed, with the consent of the parties and their counsel, divorce
matters would be diverted to an early resolution track within the
court system.244 Cooperative mediation could be initiated at any
time during the litigation; however, early election would benefit
parties by allowing cases to settle more quickly and reducing costs
attendant to protracted litigation.245  Early participation in
negotiations. Id. at 204-05 (describing the main distinction between cooperative
and collaborative methods as the inclusion of a disqualification agreement).
243. See supra text accompanying note 44 (describing the six needs met by
litigation that are not met by alternative methods of dispute resolution). The only
need that probably cannot be met by cooperative mediation is impact on the
greater social good.
244. This same process could also be utilized pre-filing. Doing so, however,
would prevent the parties from using formal discovery mechanisms if necessary,
and could cause an escalation in acrimony if it is necessary to commence an action
midway through the process to obtain discovery.
245. See Robert E. Emery, David Sbarra & Tara Grover, Divorce Mediation:
Research and Reflections, 43 FAM. CT. REv. 22, 26-27 (2005) (finding higher
settlement rates in cases that utilize mediation earlier in the litigation process); see
generally John Lande, The Movement Toward Early Case Handling in Courts and
Private Dispute Resolution, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 81, 104-12 (2008)
(discussing potential benefits of early ADR in lieu of litigation). One survey
indicated that the average cost of mediation in the Boston area was $6,600,
collaborative law cases cost $19,723, and litigated cases cost $77,746. Kane,
supra note 78.
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cooperative mediation addresses the concern that traditional
mediation may take place too late in the process to achieve any
significant cost savings for the parties.246
Active participants in cooperative mediation include the
parties, their attorneys, and a third-party mediator. In order to
participate, parties would individually and jointly commit to attempt
to avoid litigation by resolving all issues through a mutually
agreeable settlement, and file a joint acknowledgement with the
court reflecting their intention to participate in the early resolution
process. Such written commitment carries with it potential sanctions
if a party . does not participate in good faith,247 providing
encouragement for the parties to continue until a settlement is
reached. Unlike collaborative law, however, this written
commitment does not result in attorney disqualification if either
party elects to withdraw from the process. The purpose behind
requiring the agreement is the simple fact that parties are more
inclined to abide by their own agreements. 24 8
Relaxed discovery deadlines would exist in cooperative
mediation, as would access to the courts for resolution of discovery-
related issues. Rather than each party automatically retaining a
brigade of experts including appraisers, forensic accountants, and
psychologists, the parties would stipulate to jointly retain
independent experts, with each party reserving the right to offer
alternate expert opinions if one party rejects an expert's opinion, and
litigation becomes unavoidable. Cooperative mediation could
involve the use of four-way meetings, caucuses at the discretion of
the mediator, or both.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 80-82.
247. See infra Part IV.A. (providing a description of how good faith, or the
lack thereof, could be determined). See also John Lande, Using Dispute System
Design Methods to Promote Good-Faith Participation in Court-Connected
Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. REV. 69, 86-89 (2002) (discussing the
difficulty in defining good-faith).
248. See generally supra note 77 and accompanying text (stating that,
according to proponents of mediation in divorce actions, permitting parties to
exercise more control over the resolution will increase the likelihood of
compliance).
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A. The Cooperative Mediation Participation Agreement
Rewards Good Faith Without Breaching Mediation
Confidentiality
Just as the disqualification agreement is viewed as paramount
in collaborative law, a Cooperative Mediation Participation
Agreement would be a necessary feature of cooperative mediation.
Under the agreement, if the parties are unable to reach a settlement
through cooperative mediation, each must submit to the other a
written "last, best offer" of settlement, and reasons for rejecting the
opposing party's "last, best offer." Much in the same way that offers
of judgment remain outside the purview of the court until a verdict
has been reached,249 these "last, best offers" could not be disclosed
to the court until the judge has issued a final ruling on all issues,
other than attorneys' fees. This agreement would help foster the
parties' sense of procedural justice by delineating the rules of the
process and by ensuring that each is engaged and committed to
participate.
Once a judgment related to asset distribution, spousal and
child support, and parenting and child timesharing issues has been
entered, the judge would then be required to award attorney's fees
and costs for work performed subsequent to the mediation to the
party whose proposal most closely approximated the judicial
determination.2 50 If neither party's proposal is deemed "reasonable"
249. See FED. R. Cfv. P. 68(a) (providing that a defending party may make
an offer of judgment on specified terms until fourteen days before trial, but the
offer is not filed with the court until it has been accepted).
250. One of the criticisms raised against Mediation Participation
Agreements is that there are typically no sanctions built into the agreement.
Peppet, supra note 46, at 495-96. Making the attorney's fee award mandatory
addresses this perceived flaw. In determining whether a party's proposal
approximates the judgment, it should be relatively easy to compare financial
awards to settlement offers; it may be more difficult to assess the merits of the
inchoate orders addressing child-related issues. Comparison parameters that a
judge can consider when determining the reasonableness of any offers could be
similar to those contained in some state procedural rules. For example, in Florida,
pursuant to Florida Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 1.442(h)(2), some of the
relevant criteria that courts can consider include, without limitation:
(A) The then-apparent merit or lack of merit in the claim;
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compared to the final judgment, then both parties would be denied a
fee award; if both parties' proposals are within reason, and the
comparative financial resources of the parties merit an award based
on a traditional need and ability to pay analysis, the judge could
award the impecunious spouse a portion or all of the attorney's fees
incurred.251 This approach to determining good-faith would avoid
the criticism that such a requirement can result in breach of
confidentiality of mediation communications; 252 nothing other than
the final, best offer, reduced to writing by each party, would be used
as evidence of good faith. Despite some criticism of a good faith
requirement, many states already mandate good faith participation in
mediation and some authorize an award of sanctions for
violations.253 With a client facing a potential award of fees, the
(C) The closeness of questions of fact and law at issue;
(D) Whether the party making the proposal had unreasonably refused to
furnish information necessary to evaluate the reasonableness of the
proposal;
(E) Whether the suit was in the nature of a test case presenting questions
of far-reaching importance affecting nonparties; and
(F) The amount of the additional delay cost and expense that the party
making the proposal reasonably would be expected to incur if the
litigation were to be prolonged;
FLA. R. OF CIV. P. 1.442(h)(2) (West 2008).
251. Some scholars suggest that requiring offers to be made during
mediation or for courts to assess reasonableness of offers is inappropriate. E.g.,
Lande, supra note 73, at 8. However, the proposal here is not subject to such
criticism. Cooperative mediation would not be court-mandated, but rather a
voluntary election made by the parties at the commencement of the litigation.
Presumably, those who would otherwise be inclined to use mediation as a delay
tactic would not be attracted to this ADR method because of the potential for
sanctions if the process is misused.
252. For discussion of objections to a good-faith requirement, see Lande,
supra note 247, at 102 (stating that the "good faith requirement undermines the
confidentiality of mediation"); Lande, supra note 73 (noting objections to the good
faith requirement such as the uncertainty of the definition, the likelihood of court
"intrusion into the mediation process and violation of confidential protections,"
and its tendency to encourage abuse).
253. See Lande, supra note 73 ("At least 22 states have statutes requiring
good faith participation in mediation."). In addition, numerous federal district
courts and state courts have local rules adopting a good-faith requirement. Id.; see
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attorney has a vested interest in ensuring that settlement offers are
reasonable and all potential avenues for settlement are explored
before the parties resort to litigation.254
Some state statutes permit the court to consider a divorce
party's litigious conduct when awarding attorney's fees. 255  None
apparently require an award of fees, and most still require the court
to consider a party's ability to pay when deciding the amount of
attorney's fees and costs to be awarded.256 Requiring that fees be
awarded for unreasonable settlement posturing257 provides an
also Lande, Dispute System Design Methods, supra note 247, at 78-86 (discussing
mediation good-faith requirements).
254. There are potential pitfalls with this proposal, especially when the
lawyer encourages reasonable settlements that are rejected by the client. In those
situations, the attorney would want to be certain that the client file reflects the
offers suggested by the attorney and rejected by the client. This is not any
different than what an attorney would do under any circumstances when a client
declines to follow the advice of counsel. Similarly, if counsel encourages the
client to reject legitimate offers or to make unreasonable demands, and the client
relies upon the experience of counsel in accepting this advice, the client and
counsel would be in the same position as those affected by the offer of judgment
procedural rule. Collaborative law proponents may object that the burden of
settling the case is once again on the attorney, unlike in collaborative lawyering,
where the burden is shifted onto the client. However, the burden should be on the
lawyer, as the professional trained in resolving legal disputes and knowledgeable
about the underlying rights-based divorce statutes.
255. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 271 (West 2004) (authorizing an award of
attorneys' fees and costs when a party or counsel's lack of cooperation exacerbates
costly litigation and "frustrates the policy of the law to motivate settlement of
litigation").
256. See, e.g., id. (providing that the court shall not award attorneys' fees
and costs in an amount that would impose "an unreasonable financial burden on
the party against whom the sanction is imposed").
257. This approach may be subject to criticism that it is difficult to
determine whether the offer was reasonable at the time it was made during the
mediation based upon the parties' knowledge at that time. See, e.g., Lande, supra
note 247, at 88-89 (commenting that hindsight may not be a reasonable
measurement of bad faith). Such critiques could be addressed by permitting the
parties to revisit the offers made during mediation, prior to commencing trial. The
situation in divorce litigation is markedly different from that in many other types
of civil litigation where extant issues of liability could cause a party to refrain from
making an offer at mediation. Most often, entitlement to asset distribution is not
the issue in divorce litigation; instead, the value of assets, the actual division, and
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incentive for good-faith participation in cooperative mediation
without the sledge hammer "encouragement" of mandatory attorney
disqualification required in collaborative law. Because mandatory
disqualification in collaborative law cases can be triggered by
actions of either party, even a spouse who engages in good-faith
negotiations can suffer the negative impact of disqualification
without any financial recourse. In cooperative mediation, although
the "innocent" party may be disadvantaged by continued litigation,
the party continues with the same attorney without incurring the
unnecessary expense for new counsel to become familiar with the
case, and may receive an award of full fees and costs. As has been
noted in criticism of collaborative law, wholesale rejection of the
threat of litigation ignores the usefulness of this tool in encouraging
258reasonable negotiations.
B. Use of an Evaluative Mediator and Presence of
Counsel Can Ensure Procedural and Substantive
Fairness
A mediator's and counsel's participation in cooperative
mediation may enhance the parties' perception of procedural and
substantive fairness. The presence of a neutral third-party to
facilitate the settlement process and act as a sounding board for the
parties can have a beneficial, cathartic effect not provided during the
the amount and duration of support are in dispute. See generally Francis M.
Dougherty, Annotation, Divorce: Excessiveness or Adequacy of Combined
Property Division and Spousal Support Awards-Modern Cases, 55 A.L.R. 4th 14
§2[b] (1987) (discussing the issues involved in setting property division and
spousal support in divorce cases). Time-sharing and access to children may be one
area, however, where it is more difficult to assess good faith based simply on the
offers made during mediation because of the subjectivity of the "best interests of
the child," typically considered by courts in making such determinations. See
Elizabeth A. Jenkins, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Provisions for
Arbitration of Disputes as to Alimony or Support Payments or Child Visitation or
Custody Matters, 38 A.L.R. 5th 69 §2[a] (1996) (questioning whether arbitration
in divorce "deprive[s] the courts of their duty to protect the best interests of the
child").
258. Lande & Herman, supra note 49, at 281.
Winter 2011] 303
THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION
collaborative law process.2 59  Furthermore, when lawyers prepare
parties for mediation and are present during the process, parties have
a more favorable view of the process and cases are more likely to
settle.260
Several studies suggest that lawyers who have more
experience as counsel in mediation approach the
process differently than lawyers with less experience:
they tend to prepare their clients more, have a broader
conception of relevant issues and options, have
greater comfort with and appreciation of client
involvement, and adopt a less adversarial and more
problem-solving approach during the session.261
Use of a mediator also helps fulfill the parties' needs for
voice, vindication, and validation, needs that are traditionally met
only through litigation. The mediator serves a valuable role that
cannot be fulfilled in the collaborative law process, where no one
involved is impartial. In collaborative law everyone is a
stakeholder-the lawyers want the process to work or they are
unemployed, and the parties want to achieve a desirable
settlement.262 In contrast, whether a settlement is reached and the
terms of the resolution are immaterial to the mediator who is hired
only for the mediation session. The mediator's involvement in the
case is concluded when mediation ends, regardless of the outcome.
In mediation there is no motive to delay or drag out the process,
which some critics claim collaborative law encourages. 26 3
259. But see MAYER, supra note 36, at 54 (finding that, although mediators
and lawyers view neutrality of the mediator as a beneficial feature of mediation,
this may not be a significant concern for litigants participating in the process).
260. Roselle L. Wissler, Representation in Mediation: What We Know
From Empirical Research, 37 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 419,435 (2010).
261. Id. at 470 (noting, however, "that some lawyers might use their
increased familiarity with mediation to engage in strategic behavior during
mediation").
262. See supra text accompanying note 203 (stating that lawyers have an
interest in guarding the process and clients have an interest in guarding the
substance).
263. See Lande, Practical Insights, supra note 242, at 223-24 (finding that
Wisconsin attorneys who practice both collaborative and cooperative law preferred
the latter because of its relative speed); Macfarlane, supra note 151, at 61-62
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The mediator used in cooperative mediation should be trained
in marital and family law, even when both parties are represented by
competent family law attorneys. 264 Divorce settlements often require
consideration of sophisticated financial, tax, and child access issues,
which are beyond the scope of experience of many non-family law
attorney mediators.265 Settlements that address each party's
entitlements and needs can often only be achieved when the mediator
has developed sufficient experience in the areas of marital and
family law through actual practice.266
Also, the mediator should not be prohibited from offering
opinions about likely outcomes if matters are litigated. Because
divorce law is rights-based, attorneys are ethically obligated to
advise clients of their rights and obligations upon divorce under
relevant law, even when cooperating to achieve a settlement.267
Often it is helpful for spouses to hear a third-party's opinion about
application of the law to the particular set of facts presented in the
case.268 Because the mediator does not have a client to represent in
the matter, he is in a position to objectively offer an opinion.
(noting that the collaborative process tends to go at the speed of the slowest
participant).
264. See Daiker, supra note 96, at 511-13 (discussing the difficulty non-
lawyer mediators have in addressing mediation participants' legal issues). But see
MAYER, supra note 36, at 58 (indicating that "[n]either training nor substantive
expertise appears to have an impact on the outcomes of mediation" or the level of
satisfaction litigants experience). Mayer does note, however, that mediators with
legal training are more sought after than those whose professional experience may
be in other areas, such as mental health. Id. at 70.
265. See Kelly, supra note 40, at 39-40 (discussing the special requirements
of family mediation and the skills necessary to succeed at it).
266. See Dan Trigoboff, More States Adopting Divorce Mediation: With
Nonlawyer Mediators, Some Spouses Will Get Bad Deals, Critics Claim, A.B.A. J.,
Mar. 1995, at 1, 32 (noting that there are often complicated issues in divorces that
non-lawyers are not qualified to address and noting the problems mediators
inexperienced in marital and family law face).
267. See Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining in the Dark: The Normative
Incoherence of Lawyer Dispute Bargaining Role, 51 MD. L. REv. 1, 78-86 (1992)
(discussing ethical considerations of a divorce attorney in cooperative bargaining).
268. See Keet, supra note 79, at 329 (noting one criticism raised by clients
involved in traditional mediation is that the mediator's neutrality and lack of
proactive conduct may have negatively impacted the process).
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Although this suggestion runs counter to many mediation training
programs that reject any reference to likely litigation results,2
potential benefits of an evaluative form of mediation have been
recognized. 270 At least one study indicated that 60% of mediation
participants wanted mediators to offer opinions about projected
results if the matters were litigated, and 84% felt that mediator
recommendations about a specific settlement were valuable in
resolving disputes.271 A non-lawyer mediator would not be in a
position to offer this information.
Often a client just needs an opinion from another expert
trained in family law who has heard both sides of the story about
whether the positions of the parties are meritorious.272 Lawyers' and
269. See Susan Raines et al., Best Practices for Mediation Training and
Regulation: Preliminary Findings, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 541, 548-49 (2010)
(discussing complaints against mediators who pressure parties to accept a
particular result or settlement).
270. See generally L. Randolph Lowry, Evaluative Mediation, in DIVORCE
AND FAMILY MEDIATION: MODELS, TECHNIQUES, AND APPLICATIONS 72, 72-91
(Jay Folberg, Anne L. Milne, & Peter Salem, eds., 2004). To what extent
mediators engage in an evaluative process is often determined by whether the
mediator is an attorney and whether attorneys are representing parties during the
process. See, e.g., An Overview of Divorce Mediation, ARIZONA FAMILY
MEDIATION CENTER, http://www.azfamilymediationcenter.com/overview.php (last
visited Oct. 20, 2010) (explaining that if a mediator is an attorney, his role in the
mediation is limited). Some mediators reject evaluative mediation, claiming that it
runs counter to the expressed preference of litigants for a process that does not
include settlement pressure from the mediator. Kelly, supra note 40, at 40. But
see supra text accompanying note 114 (indicating that, even with apparent
neutrality, the conflict resolution process may seem unfair to some). For an
analysis of critiques of facilitative and evaluative mediation, see John Lande,
Toward More Sophisticated Mediation Theory, 2000 J. DisP. RESOL. 321, 322-28
(2000).
271. John Lande, Doing the Best Mediation You Can, DIsP. RESOL. MAG.,
Spring and Summer 2008, at 43, 44. In contrast, only 36% of the mediators felt it
was appropriate to offer opinions about ultimate outcomes and only 38% felt
comfortable recommending specific settlements. Id. Lawyers also appear to join
their clients' preference for an evaluative form of mediation, as evidenced by the
high demand for retired judges as mediators, possibly because the use of a retired
judge resembles trial dynamics. John Lande, Judging Judges and Dispute
Resolution Processes, 7 NEV. L.J. 457,465 (2007).
272. It was not unusual for the author to observe during her twenty-five
years as a marital and family law attorney that many cases would settle at
mediation once the parties had agreed that the mediator was not prohibited from
offering an opinion about the ultimate outcome on a particularly contentious issue.
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mediators' focus on neutrality during mediation is inconsistent with
client preferences; parties generally are not satisfied with a method
that prevents an expert from offering opinions to help reach a
reasoned settlement decision.273 Permitting the mediator to offer
opinions furthers procedural and substantive justice because parties
will be well-informed of their statutory rights and obligations under
the law, and can realistically assess whether an agreement should
alter those entitlements. This information is especially crucial when
one or both parties lack counsel. Absent a vehicle for receiving this
information, parties can legitimately question the fairness of the
process.
In cases where at least one party is not represented by
counsel, allowing the mediators to offer opinions about likely
judicial rulings would aid in ensuring that settlements were reached
through informed consent. One-half or more of all divorce litigants
27are not represented by counsel.27 Evaluative cooperative mediation
would address concerns of procedural and substantive fairness found
lacking when parties enter into settlement agreements with
inadequate knowledge of their rights and responsibilities upon
divorce.
Collaborative lawyers (and others) may object to including
projected litigated outcomes in the settlement process, which they
maintain should be strictly interest-based, without regard to statutory
entitlements.275 This argument, however, ignores the fact that
divorce is a rights-based cause of action and all parties should know
how those rights and obligations may be defined through judicial
resolution before agreeing to a settlement varying such entitlements.
Absent such knowledge, mediation agreements could continue to
lack informed consent, tainting legitimacy and fairness of the
273. See supra text accompanying notes 112-14 (indicating that clients do
not always prefer completely neutral mediators).
274. See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, The Organized Bar and the Collaborative Law
Movement: A Study in Professional Change, 50 ARIZ. L REV. 289, 294 n.20 (2008)
(discussing a 1997 report that over one-half of divorce litigants in California
appeared in court without counsel (citing Sharon Lerman, Litigants Without
Lawyers Flood Courts, CAL. B.J., July 2001, at 1)).
275. See supra note 150 and accompanying text (discussing how lawyers see
collaborative law as helpful to clients and protective of clients' interests through
settlement).
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276process. Agreements based "on the outcomes of arguments about
entitlement claims" are
[M]ore substantively legitimate . . . . Legal rights
should mean the same thing wherever vindicated....
[Persons who] use the legal system . . . are entitled to
presume that their disputes will be resolved according
to law. They may choose to waive this entitlement
for non-legal considerations such as fear of publicity,
an immediate need for cash, personal feelings for the
adversary, intolerance for conflict, moral sensibilities,
and the like, and this decision is not troublesome if it
represents the free choice of one value over another,
when both choices are known. But the selection of a
negotiated outcome over an adjudicated one, by itself,
should not be seen as a waiver of this entitlement.
In a reasonably just legal system, therefore,
"the justice of negotiated outcomes exists, at a
minimum, to the extent the parties' competing legal
claims are competently raised, debated and
resolved." 277
Commentators have also noted that when agreements are
entered into without adequate knowledge of legal rights being
waived, post-divorce conflict can actually increase,278 eliminating
the purported ADR benefits of increased compliance and reduced
acnmony.
The acknowledgement signed by the parties and counsel
initiating the cooperative mediation process must clearly establish
that the goal of the early resolution track is to allow the parties to
focus on interest-based, rather than solely rights-based
276. See supra text accompanying notes 48-52 (discussing shortcomings of
the mediation process).
277. Condlin, Bargaining with a Hugger, supra note 158, at 82 (citations
omitted).
278. See Murphy, supra note 40, at 906 (noting that waiver of important
rights can exacerbate conflicts in family disputes).
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negotiations. 279 This is not inconsistent with the earlier suggestion
that mediators should be permitted to offer professional opinions
about likely outcomes if the case is litigated. It can be very effective
for a mediator to advise parties that they can agree to alternatives
that a court could not order because of statutory constraints. 2s0
Rather than restricting parties' views to only what a judge could
award, this frees them and their lawyers to create individualized
settlements. Knowledge of entitlements is first necessary, however,
to ensure that parties have comparable bargaining power.
Once a secure rights-based method of dispute
resolution (essentially the rule of law) is established
to check unrestrained power-based alternatives,
interest-based alternatives can and should flourish.
Many of the critiques of conflict resolution suggest
that the rush to embrace interest-based methodologies
has weakened the structures that constrain undesirable
power-based approaches. As a result, either the less
powerful are placed at a disadvantage, or conflict is
repressed. There is a parallel argument that any
systemic effort to engage people in an interest-based
approach will necessarily undermine the rights-based
structure and thus expose people to the unbridled
power of dominant or domineering individuals or
281
organizations.
Consequently, both procedural and substantive fairness may
only be achieved when parties engage in interest-based negotiations
with full knowledge of their legal rights and obligations if a
settlement is not reached.
Under the proposed form of cooperative mediation, the
mediator then becomes the guardian of the process and the lawyers
assume the appropriate role of advocates on behalf of their clients,
279. See, e.g., ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES:
NEGOTIATION AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (1981) (providing an example of
interest-based negotiation tactics).
280. See, e.g., supra note 7 (describing some types of agreements courts are
prohibited from ordering).
281. MAYER, supra note 36, at 48.
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without controlling the process, as required under the collaborative
law paradigm.282 Both four-way meetings and caucuses are valuable
options for the mediator. At times, a case can be settled only if the
parties are never in the same room, while other times mediation can
commence with a joint session and then break into caucus
sessions.283 Occasionally, a case can be fully mediated with all
parties in the same room.2 84  The flexibility of cooperative
mediation, unlike collaborative law where both parties and counsel
are present during all negotiations, allows for these variations
depending upon the particular family circumstances. Cooperative
mediation would not elevate the form of the settlement process
dynamic over the substance of what can be achieved through other
formats.
Divorce is a product of statutory creation carrying with it
certain rights and obligations vis-Ai-vis the parties, the parties and
their children, and the parties and the state beyond the typical
layperson's knowledge; lawyers are necessary to safeguard the
legislative intent and ensure substantive fairness. Research suggests
that lawyers positively contribute to the orderly disposition of family
law cases. 28 In most cases involving more than routine asset
distribution and support issues, the services of attorneys, and other
skilled professionals, are required.286 Lawyers can also effectively
balance power between the parties. Without such balancing, any
dispute resolution procedure, whether deemed adversarial or not,
runs the risk of disadvantaging the less powerful party.
282. See supra text accompanying note 203 (noting that the collaborative
lawyer is the guardian of the process).
283. SARAH R. COLE, CRAIG A. MCEWEN, & NANCY H. ROGERS,
MEDIATION: LAW POLICY & PRACTICE § 3.2 (2d ed. 2001).
284. FRENKEL & STARK, supra note 99, at 193-98.
285. See Alex J. Harder, Nonlawyer Legal Assistance and Access to Justice,
67 FORDHAM L. REv. 2241, 2245 (1999) (contending that the ethical obligations of
confidentiality, candor, competence, and loyalty imposed on lawyers by the courts
contribute to the orderly operation of the legal system).
286. Separate and apart from the asset distribution and support entitlements
that are statutorily created, tax issues related to support and certain asset
distributions, such as qualified retirement funds, require the expertise of financial
advisors. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 71 (2006) (detailing tax ramifications of alimony);
id § 1041 (2006) (providing for the non-taxability of certain transfers of property
incident to divorce); 29 U.S.C. § 1056 (2006) (allowing non-taxable transfers of
retirement funds between spouses pursuant to a qualified domestic relations order).
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The risks of mediation are . . . heightened when one
party is less powerful than the other. [When parties
are unrepresented, the l]ack of formal procedures;
confidential, private setting; focus on the parties'
"needs" rather than "rights" under substantive family
law; and virtual lack of review of both the process and
outcome of mediation create a setting where the more
powerful may dominate, and bias and prejudice are
unchecked.28
Few divorcing couples are able to part company with only a
minimal amount of acrimony; in most situations parties are, as a
result of statutory rights and obligations, placed in an adversarial
position with inconsistent goals.288 Even when those goals are the
same-such as care and provision for minor children-methods for
meeting those goals typically cause the attendant burdens to be
placed disproportionately between the parties; one party may have a
higher earning capacity or one party may have more time available
to meet the children's needs. Only those considered to be "high-
functioning" adults generally have the capacity to equitably
apportion those responsibilities without assistance of counsel.
ADR experts have suggested that having lawyers involved
throughout the family law mediation process is often less
287. Murphy, supra note 40, at 908.
288. See supra Part II (describing divorce as an adversarial, rights-based
process).
289. The pro se litigant presents a special problem in family litigation. See
Steven K. Berenson, A Family Law Residency Program?: A Modest Proposal in
Response to the Burdens Created by Self-Represented Litigants in Family Court,
33 RUTGERS L.J. 105, 117-18 (discussing the burdens of legal fees and the number
of low- to moderate-income litigants that represent themselves). The financial
issues become complex because there may be a lack of adequate funds to meet the
needs of the parties and their children. See id at 118-19 (discussing the burdens
of cost on litigants and the choices they may have to make in proceeding pro se).
When child-related issues are involved, the parties are often unable to afford the
cost of professional help for themselves and their children. See id at 144
(discussing the cost of other professionals involved in collaborative divorce).
Studies have indicated that the percentages of family cases where at least one party
was unrepresented by counsel ranged from 50%-72%, and the percentages
increased over a several year period. Id. at 110-11.
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traumatizing for the parties.290 One former family law mediator
observed, "I was aware that some people felt safer and less
traumatized when their lawyers worked out the terms of an
agreement, particularly early in the divorce process, than if they tried
to work it through for themselves, especially in the immediate
presence of their spouse." 291  Consequently, attorneys serve a
valuable role during cooperative mediation. Between the combined
efforts of counsel, who provide individual advice to the clients, and
the mediator, who can offer an opinion on ultimate outcomes,
spouses receive information necessary to make a reasoned settlement
decision.
C. Relaxed Discovery Deadlines and Use ofJointly-
Retained Experts Increases the Cost-Effectiveness of
Cooperative Mediation
Artificial time constraints imposed by procedural discovery
deadlines can often hinder the resolution of family law cases. 292
Rarely are both people at the same emotional and psychological
levels at the outset; consequently, clients often need time to
acclimate to the reality that the divorce is imminent. Forcing parties
to immediately engage in mandatory discovery and disclosures does
not allow the blind-sided party an opportunity to look beyond the
290. See MAYER, supra note 36, at 53 ("Conflict avoidance is a powerful
urge, and many people find the direct participation required by most resolution
processes to be painful and even traumatizing . . . . [P]articipating in mediation
can actually be more emotionally draining and even traumatizing than court action
and certainly than lawyer-conducted negotiations.").
291. MAYER, supra note 36, at 53. In addition, Macfarlane notes that some
clients who participated in her collaborative law study had previously engaged in
an unsuccessful mediation without the assistance of counsel. MACFARLANE, supra
note 151, at 71. Others had considered both collaborative law and mediation as
options, but had selected collaborative law because lawyers were involved. Id.
Those who felt their spouse had a negotiating advantage were especially attracted
to this feature. Id. at 71-72. It was not always clear, however, whether the clients
had reached these conclusions themselves or were influenced by the collaborative
lawyers they retained, who often advised that lawyers were not active participants
in mediation. Id. at 71-73.
292. See MACFARLANE, supra note 151, at 61 (acknowledging that, while
many lawyers and litigants find the time constraints "unhelpful," the slow process
of collaborative law often frustrates litigants).
3 12 [Vol. 30:2
WE CAN WORK IT OUT
immediate response of anger and vindictiveness. Procedural rules
requiring parties to comply with discovery requirements based on
standardized timelines run the risk of polarizing the parties, resulting
in adversarial posturing from the outset that is difficult to shed at a
293later point in favor of a more amicable approach.29 On the other
hand, such deadlines prevent mediation from becoming a device to
gain a tactical advantage through delay, rather than a means to
engage in good-faith settlement negotiations.294
A flexible discovery timetable should be used for those cases
that proceed with cooperative mediation to balance one party's need
for time to grasp the realities of the divorce with the other party's
interest in preventing the action from simply languishing. In
contrast, in the collaborative law process the balance always weighs
in favor of the party who "is not ready" to move forward,295
essentially creating a veto power that can stymie a prompt
settlement. Although deadlines for discovery compliance should be
included, joint requests by counsel for additional time to complete
discovery should be liberally granted by the court. 296  Deadlines,
even fluid ones, are necessary because, absent these external
motivators, a party may be tempted to delay the process, especially
when that party may not be in favor of the divorce.
To ensure that matters are proceeding towards a resolution
and neither party is delaying the process, either intentionally or
simply because sometimes it is easier not to face difficult
circumstances, counsel for the parties should be required to submit
periodic joint statements to the court advising of the status of the
matter. Only when no discernible progress has occurred for an
293. See supra text accompanying notes 80-82 (describing increasing
difficulty in maintaining an amicable relationship after pleadings, motions, and
discovery requests have been filed).
294. Schmitz, supra note 132, at 794.
295. See supra text accompanying note 230 (noting that collaborative law
proceeds at the pace of the slowest participant).
296. Cases that extend beyond arbitrary deadlines imposed on judges to
conclude a case within a specified time period require judges to justify to superiors
(chief judges and court administrators) why the cases have not been concluded.
See supra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing Florida's "presumptively
reasonable" time period). Justifying deviations from the strict completion
deadlines, however, would present an unnecessary monitoring of case progress for
those cases electing the cooperative mediation process.
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extended period of time (such as 90 days) should a court feel
compelled to step in and offer the parties a nudge by setting stricter
deadlines. Unlike collaborative law, which provides no procedural
mechanism for resolving discovery issues because resort to the
courts is not permitted, cooperative mediation allows for the
appropriate use of judicial authority to prevent settlement discussions
from stalling. Any coercion implicit in the threat of litigation is
much less onerous than the risk of losing one's attorney through the
actions of the opposing party in collaborative law.
Parties participating in cooperative mediation should also be
required to use informal discovery means. Rather than incurring
costs to issue subpoenas and take records custodian depositions,
counsel should stipulate to the execution of sworn authorizations for
the release of relevant records, as suggested in collaborative law. 298
Financial records such as banking, credit card, and tax information
will always be relevant when issues concerning asset distribution and
support are present. Requiring counsel to subpoena copies of
records that may not be in the parties' possession serves no purpose
other than to prolong litigation and incur unnecessary litigation costs,
such as witness and court reporter fees.
Unlike collaborative lawyers, attorneys participating in
cooperative mediation would not be required to voluntarily disclose
information adverse to the client so that the attorney-client privilege
would be preserved and clients would be more likely to disclose
unfavorable information.299 Obtaining compliance with mandatory
297. See supra text accompanying note 147 (noting collaborative law
prohibits resort to the courts if the parties do not settle).
298. See supra notes 200-201 and accompanying text (discussing the
informal procedures within the collaborative law process and recommending that
parties execute voluntary authorizations to obtain records when they do not have
necessary information).
299. Clients should expect that information disclosed to their attorneys will
not become public knowledge. In addition, the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct require attorneys to maintain the confidences of their clients. MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2007). One problem with the requirement
of voluntary full disclosure and the potential breach of attorney-client privilege in
collaborative law cases is that it creates a class of lawyers to whom the
confidentiality requirement does not extend, possibly causing confusion for the
public. This rule imposes a duty on potential clients to ask lawyers before they are
retained if the communications are privileged. If this inquiry is made, the
collaborative lawyer possibly could not represent the client because the attorney
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disclosure requirements imposed by the legislature is often difficult
enough because of the unwillingness or inability to address the
inevitable finality of the divorce.30 0 If a client is aware that the
lawyer must disclose any adverse information, there is little incentive
for the client to disclose information to the lawyer.
Aside from attorneys' fees, the largest cost incurred by
parties in the midst of a divorce proceeding are the fees associated
with expert witnesses. 30 1 With hourly rates that often approximate or
exceed attorneys' rates, 302 experts in forensic accounting, business
valuation, real property appraisal, and forensic psychology
substantially increase the divorcing couples' costs, decreasing assets
available for distribution and to meet the support needs of the
spouses and their children. Dispensing with experts is often not an
option. Even when couples may be amicably approaching their
divorce, disagreements over asset valuation can often result in
impenetrable roadblocks to settlement, unless experts can provide
documented values.303 Having an expert, especially one that counsel
for both parties recognize as an expert in the field, serves as a reality
check for the parties when their expectations may be unrealistic.
could reasonably suspect the client may be unwilling to disclose unfavorable
information, which would be evidence of bad faith under the collaborative law
model. See TESLER, supra note 80, at 130 (discussing the situations in which
lawyers may not be able to represent individuals, including when a client acts in
bad faith). This dangerous path, which would require disclosure of attorney-client
communications by some lawyers, should not be followed.
300. J. Herbie DiFonzo, A Vision for Collaborative Practice: The Final
Report of the Hofstra Collaborative Law Conference, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 569,
587 (2009) (describing the difficulty in obtaining confidential data from clients in
the face of full disclosure obligations).
301. Note, Contingent Fees for Expert Witnesses in Civil Litigation, 86
YALE L.J. 1680, 1680-81, 1681 n.4 (1977); Note, Filling the Void: Judicial Power
and Jurisdictional Attacks on Judgments, 87 YALE L.J. 164, 184 n.102 (1977).
302. See Contingent Fees for Expert Witnesses in Civil Litigation, supra
note 301, at 1681 n.4 (comparing expert fees to other costs of litigation).
303. See generally Brett R. Turner, Equalizing Access to Expert Testimony:
Expert's Fees Awards and Court-Appointed Experts, DIVORCE LmG., Jan. 1997, at
13, 13 (discussing the need for and costs associated with expert testimony in
divorce litigation).
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Under the cooperative mediation method, counsel would
agree to joint expert witnesses, preserving the right to challenge the
experts' opinions if settlement is not reached and litigation ensues.
The advantage is that neither party would be compelled to accept the
experts' opinions, but would be aware that the court could accept
that opinion. As a result, before incurring additional costs, parties
can realistically assess whether the expense is justified. Having a
well-respected expert offer an opinion to the parties, even in
disciplines where differences in opinion are common, can often
ameliorate factual controversies. When a party is aware that the
court may accept the expert's opinion, settlement could become
much easier. The financial benefit to the parties is obvious-two
may be able to live as cheaply as one, but two experts likely cost
double that of one expert.
V. CONCLUSION
Divorce is an adversarial process based on an allocation of
statutorily-imposed rights and obligations. Even in the best of
circumstances, the parties involved do not fully share a commonality
of goals. Litigation provides a means of resolving legal issues and
serves parties' needs for procedural justice. It often does so at a high
financial, emotional, and psychological cost for the parties and their
children. Lawyers and experts involved in litigation, as well as those
experts that deal with the remains of the family once the divorce is
over, recognize that resolving disputes outside of the courtroom and
avoiding the positional posturing required during litigation can
reduce some of the long-term detrimental effects of the divorce
process.
Various ADR methods have been offered as the solution to
the problems associated with divorce litigation. There is no one-
size-fits-all solution. New ADR methods are slow to gain
acceptance in the legal community, due in large part to lawyers'
predisposition to litigation and parties' interests in procedural and
substantive justice. Two popular ADR processes-mediation and
collaborative law-used with differing levels of success, are similar
in several ways but radically differ in key process features. Criticism
about both processes is well-placed, making neither wholly
acceptable for resolving divorce disputes.
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Parties often participate in mediation without the benefit of
legal advice, the lack of which can result in settlements reached
without informed consent. The typical neutrality of the mediator's
role is inconsistent with the parties' needs for information and
guidance. Without counsel and with a neutral mediator, parties
receive no explanation of their rights and obligations upon divorce,
causing them to enter into agreements that can be procedurally and
substantively unfair.
Collaborative law's mandatory attorney disqualification can
coerce parties into remaining at the bargaining table because the
financial and emotional costs that result upon withdrawal from the
process are too great. The attorney disqualification provision raises
ethical concerns because an attorney can be discharged by the
unilateral actions of the opposing party, and the traditional attorney-
client roles protecting confidentiality of communications and
mandating zealous advocacy may be absent.
The proposed new ADR paradigm, cooperative mediation,
creates a hybrid approach, capitalizing on favorable features of both
mediation and collaborative law. It holds parties responsible for
reaching a resolution, with the assistance of counsel acting solely on
each party's behalf, and an evaluative mediator. Cooperative
mediation addresses criticism leveled against both mediation and
collaborative law because it: (1) contemplates that the cooperative
mediation process would be selected early in the divorce action to
avoid unnecessary attorneys' fees and costs, and reduce the
acrimonious nature of divorce by eliminating the need for litigation
posturing; (2) relies upon an evaluative mediator who can allow the
parties an opportunity to meet their needs for voice, vindication, and
validation, typically only found in litigation; (3) provides that parties
will generally be represented by counsel to ensure both procedural
and substantive fairness; (4) relaxes discovery deadlines and
promotes the use of jointly-retained experts for a more cost-effective
dispute resolution mechanism; and (5) focuses on interest-based
negotiations without ignoring statutorily-imposed rights and
obligations, so that agreements reached are the product of informed
consent.
This is not to suggest that cooperative mediation is the only
process that should be used to resolve divorce disputes. The
continuing change in methodologies used in ADR processes
indicates that there is a need for a one-size-does-not-fit-all approach.
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Suggesting that only one method can be used to meet the needs of all
families involved in divorce runs counter to the goal of
individualized settlements geared towards each family's unique
circumstances. Rather than claiming one process is "the best," and
those who do not engage in it are somehow flawed and not realizing
304their highest potential, a more holistic approach that the
appropriate ADR method is the one that works for the particular
family is required.305 If lawyers impose their own preferences for a
particular ADR paradigm on clients, intentionally or unintentionally,
then the process begins, and likely remains, with the lawyer in
control, rather than allowing parties the opportunity to truly engage
in private ordering.
304. See TESLER, supra note 80, at 5 (discussing how no other dispute-
resolution modality matches collaborative law in its ability to manage and resolve
conflict).
305. See Lande and Herman, supra note 49, at 284 (suggesting the clients
should be offered a choice of ADR processes).
3 18 [Vol. 30:2
